



Robots and other artificial intelligence-based technologies are increas-
ingly outperforming humans in jobs previously thought safe from automation.
This has led to growing concerns about the future ofjobs, wages, economic
equality, and government revenues. To address these issues, there have been
multiple calls around the world to tax the robots. Although the concerns that
have led to the recent robot tax proposals may be valid, this Article cautions
against the use of a robot tax. It argues that a tax that singles out robots is
the wrong tool to address these critical issues and warns of the unintended
consequences of such a tax, including limiting innovation. Rather, advances
in robotics and other forms of artificial intelligence merely exacerbate the
issues already caused by a tax system that undertaxes capital income and
overtaxes labor income. Thus, this Article proposes tax policy measures that
seek to rebalance our tax system so that capital income and labor income are
taxed in parity. Because tax policy alone cannot solve all of the issues raised
by the robotics revolution, this Article also recommends non-tax policy
measures that seek to improve the labor market, support displaced workers,
and encourage innovation. Together, these changes have the potential to
manage the threat of automation while also maximizing its advantages,
thereby easing our transition into this new automation era.
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I. INTRODUCTION
We are on the brink of a new technological revolution. Rapid advances
in automation technologies-including artificial intelligence, robotics, ma-
chine learning, and other advanced computer technology-have begun to fun-
damentally transform our economy, society, and world.2 In recent years, due
to this new wave of technology, we have already seen robots3 perform legal
work, assist with medical surgeries, execute online marketing decisions, un-
derwrite insurance policies, analyze financial data, self-drive cars, and per-
form numerous other cognitive tasks previously reserved for humans.4 Many
1. This new time period has been referred to as "The Robot Revolution," "The Automation Rev-
olution," "The Technological Era," "The Fourth Industrial Revolution," "The Second Machine Age,"
and "The Digital Revolution," among other names. See, e.g., ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW
MCAFEE, RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE: How THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION IS ACCELERATING
INNOVATION, DRIVING PRODUCTIVITY, AND IRREVERSIBLY TRANSFORMING EMPLOYMENT AND THE
ECONOMY (2011) [hereinafter RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE]; ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW
MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: WORK, PROGRESS, AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT
TECHNOLOGIES (2014) [hereinafter THE SECOND MACHINE AGE]; JAMES MANYIKA ET AL.,
MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., A FUTURE THAT WORKS: AUTOMATION, EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY
(2017), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Featured%/`20Insights/Digital%/`2ODisrup-
tion/Harnessing%/o20automation%/o20for/o20a%20future%20that%20works/MGI-A-future-that-
works Full-report.ashx; KLAUS SCHWAB, THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION (2016); William
Wilkes, How the World's Biggest Companies Are Fine-Tuning the Robot Revolution, WALL STREET
J. (May 14, 2018, 10:24 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-the-worlds-biggest-companies-are-
fine-tuning-the-robot-revolution-i1526307839.
2. See MARTIN FORD, RISE OF THE ROBOTS: TECHNOLOGY AND THE THREAT OF A JOBLESS
FUTURE 1-26 (2016); see also THE SECOND MACHINE AGE, supra note 1, at 14-96 (discussing some
of the most important, recent technological advances).
3. See THE SECOND MACHINE AGE, supra note 1, at 27-37. Although a uniform definition of
"robot" does not currently exist, most definitions treat the ability of a machine to function with "suf-
ficient autonomy, and a capacity to learn, progress and make decisions" as a key characteristic. Xavier
Oberson, Taxing Robots? From the Emergence of an Electronic Ability to Pay to a Tax on Robots or
the Use ofRobots, 9 WORLD TAX J., 247, 250 (2017). Thus, this Article uses the term "robots" broadly
to refer to the newest wave of technology that relies on artificial intelligence, big data, machine learn-
ing, or algorithms to automate higher level cognitive tasks previously performed only by humans. See
id.
4. See Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael A. Osborne, The Future ofEmployment: How Susceptible
are Jobs to Computerisation?, 114 TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 254 (2017); Jane
Croft, Artificial Intelligence Closes in on the Work ofJunior Lawyers, FIN. TIMES (May 4, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/f80987Oc-26al-11e7-8691-d5f7eOcdOal6; Dan Mangan, Lawyers Could
Be the Next Profession to Be Replaced By Computers, CNBC (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/
2017/02/17/lawyers-could-be-replaced-by-artificial-intelligence.html; Xavier Oberson, How Taxing
Robots Could Help Bridge Future Revenue Gaps, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/forum/oec-
dyearbook/how-taxing-robots-could-help-bridge-future-revenue-gaps.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2018);
Erik Sherman, 5 White-Collar Jobs RobotsAlready Have Taken, FORTUNE (Feb. 25, 2015), http://for-
tune.com/2015/02/25/5-jobs-that-robots-already-are-taking/.
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predict that this is only the beginning of a major paradigm shift.5
Although the rapid emergence of these new technologies provides numer-
ous benefits to society, it also presents substantial challenges. In particular,
the automation of jobs through the use of robots and other advanced technol-
ogies has led to growing concerns about extensive unemployment and plum-
meting tax revenues. This, in turn, has led to concerns that the increase in
profits that robots create will primarily benefit the few companies driving the
automation, which will further intensify the existing inequality in the distri-
bution of income, wealth, and influence. To address these concerns, there
have been recent calls worldwide for the adoption of a robot tax.6
A "robot tax" is essentially a way to treat a robot the same as a person for
tax purposes.7 It generally does so by subjecting the income generated by a
robot to income and/or payroll taxes, which are payable by the company using
the robot. By increasing the cost of robots, the robot tax attempts to level the
playing field between robots and humans, preserve jobs, and raise additional
tax revenues to support displaced workers.
I argue that a robot tax is the wrong tool to address the issues raised by
this new automation era. A robot tax gives rise to substantial practical issues
and negative policy implications. In particular, implementing the proposed
robot tax requires identifying the robot and subjecting the income it generates
to taxation. But what is a "robot" for these purposes, how do we measure how
much income it generates, and what is the purpose of this line drawing? At-
tempting to resolve these issues shows the significant difficulties involved in
implementing and designing a robot tax that is equitable, effective, and en-
forceable. Moreover, a tax on robots is equivalent to a tax on innovation and
is likely to hinder economic growth and overall prosperity. Given the many
benefits of automation and technological progress, limiting innovation is a
poor strategy for improving workplace stability, social welfare, and tax reve-
nues.
Nevertheless, tax policy can play an important role in addressing the con-
cerns raised by this technological revolution.8 In particular, many of these
5. See THE SECOND MACHINE AGE, supra note 1, at 9; FORD, supra note 2, at 26-27; Ryan Calo,
Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 515 (2015).
6. Infra Part III.
7. See Ryan Abbott & Bret Bogenschneider, Why We Should Start Taxing the Robots That Are
Taking Human Jobs, CONVERSATION (Feb. 28, 2018, 8:41 AM), http://theconversation.com/why-we-
should-start-taxing-the-robots-that-are-taking-human-jobs-91295; infra Section III.A.
8. There is a growing recognition among academics that tax policy should be considered in this
context. See, e.g., Ryan Abbott & Bret Bogenschneider, ShouldRobots Pay Taxes? Tax Policy in the
Age ofAutomation, 12 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 145, 149-51 (2018); Roberta F. Mann, IRobot: U
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concerns are symptoms of a larger problem: namely, the manner in which the
tax law currently undertaxes capital income and overtaxes labor income. As
our economy continues to evolve to one that increasingly relies on robots and
other capital assets, this taxation disparity creates many negative externalities
and is no longer justifiable. Thus, the automation revolution provides yet an-
other reason to reevaluate the tax preferences granted to capital income.
This Article sets forth several proposals that seek to rebalance our tax
system towards a more neutral tax system as between labor and capital in-
come. 9 First, Congress should reform the current payroll tax system to mini-
mize its burden on labor income and expand its burden on capital income.10
Because labor income bears the majority of payroll taxes, these changes are
necessary to minimize the distortive effect that the existing tax system has on
an employer's use of capital versus its use of labor. These changes, together
with the introduction of a new tax base, are also necessary to counteract the
unfavorable impact that automation increasingly has on the existing payroll
tax base.
Second, I recommend that we reform the taxation of capital income. By
considering the justification for taxing capital income from the lens of the
robotics revolution, this Article contributes to the growing literature that sup-
ports taxing capital income. 12 Specifically, it argues that these new automa-
tion technologies put further pressure on a tax system that relies heavily on
labor income for its tax base. 13 By granting tax preferences to capital income,
the tax system also encourages the nonoptimal use of robots, which creates
undesirable economic inefficiencies and deadweight losses." Automation
Tax? Considering the Tax Policy Implications ofAutomation, McGill L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript
at 1-2) (on file with author); Jay A. Soled & Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Automation and the Income
Tax 2 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Section IV.A.
11. See infra Section IV.B.
12. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Dmitry Zelik, Are We Trapped by Our Capital Gains? 59
(Univ. of Mich., Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Ser. No. 476, 2015), http://ssm.com/ab-
stract=2642860; David Gamage, The Case for Taxing (All of Labor Income, Consumption, Capital
Income, and Wealth, 68 TAx L. REv. 355, 401 (2015); Edward D. Kleinbard, Capital Taxation in an
Age oflnequality, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 593, 656-58 (2017); Chris William Sanchirico,A Critical Look
at the Economic Argument for Taxing Only Labor Income, 63 TAX L. REV. 867, 867 (2010); Philippe
Aghion et al., Optimal Capital Versus Labor Taxation with Innovation-Led Growth 2 (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19086, 2013); Victor Fleischer, Alpha: Labor Is the New Cap-
ital 11 (Nov. 19, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://ostromworkshop.indi-
ana.edu/pdf/seriespapers/2015f c/fleischerpaper.pdf).
13. See infra Section IV.B.1.
14. See Fleischer, supra note 12, at 31-32.
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also further blurs the labor-capital distinction, which creates tax gaming op-
portunities.15 In addition, automation magnifies the tax system's effect on
economic inequality by widening the economic gap between capital owners
and workers. Several provisions in the recent Tax Act further exacerbate
many of these issues by increasing the tax system's preference for capital over
labor income.
Finally, this Article recognizes that neither the robot tax nor the suggested
tax policy proposals will adequately address all of the concerns raised by the
automation revolution. 16 Instead, nontax policy measures must also be
adopted. These policies should seek to provide a substantial investment in
human capital, an adequate social safety net to help displaced workers, and
promote innovation.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II of this Article discusses the
threats, but also recognizes the benefits, posed by the increasingly prevalent
use of robots and other manifestations of artificial intelligence.17 Part III cri-
tiques the use of a robot tax as a means to address these issues.18 This descrip-
tive claim has normative consequences: namely, the better we understand why
this proposal does not adequately address the concerns raised by the automa-
tion revolution, the better position we are in to adopt a proposal that does.
Part IV argues that to address the challenges raised by the latest technological
revolution, we need more fundamental tax reform that does not single out ro-
bots for taxation. 19 It proposes various methods to reform the current tax sys-
tem's preference for capital income over labor income in the context of both
the payroll tax and the income tax, and also suggests several targeted non-tax
policy measures. It concludes that adopting these measures will allow us to
mitigate some of the concerns raised by the rise in robotics and also improve
the equity and efficiency of our tax system as a whole. 20
II. THE THREAT OF THE ROBOT
Advances in technology often produce many benefits including efficiency
gains, economic growth, increased wealth, and a higher standard of living. 21
15. See infra Section IV.B.1.
16. See infra Section IV.C.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See infra Part V.
21. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, AUTOMATION, AND THE
ECONOMY 6, 11-12 (2016),
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The technological progress made in the fields of artificial intelligence, robot-
ics, machine learning, and other advanced computer technology is no excep-
tion.2 2 Despite these benefits, automation technologies have also given rise to
considerable fears and concerns. 23 The following section discusses the labor
market disruption, increased economic inequality, and government tax short-
falls potentially caused by the latest technological revolution.
A. Loss ofJobs
Robots are Coming for You and Your Job.24 You Will Lose Your Job to a
Robot-and Sooner Than You Think.25 Robot Automation Will Take 800 Mil-
lion Jobs by 2030.26 These recent headlines summarize the fear and anxiety
created by the robotics revolution: the fear of massive technological unem-
ployment.27
But is this a rational fear? Despite widespread public concern over the
threat of massive unemployment, there is disagreement regarding whether
widespread unemployment due to technological advances is a valid concern. 28
On the one hand, experts argue that this fear is overstated.29 They predict that
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/Artificial-Intelligence-
Automation-Economy.pdf; NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 1 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.ar-
chives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehousefiles/microsites/ostp/NSTC/pre paring for the fu-
ture of ai.pdf; RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE, supra note 1, at 8, 20-22, 28; Yvonne A. Stevens, The
Future: Innovation and Jobs, 56 JURIMETRICS J. 367, 368 (2016).
22. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 21, at 6-7; NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL,
supra note 21, at 5.
23. See Stevens, supra note 21, at 367; infra Part II.
24. Olivia Oran& Victoria Woollaston, Robots are Com ingfor You and Your Job: Experts Discuss
the Imminent Threat of Machines on EVERY Industry, DAILY MAIL (May 3, 2016, 9:08 PM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3572378/Rich-powerful-wam-robots-coming-
jobs.html.
25. Kevin Drum, You Will Lose Your Job to a Robot-and Sooner than You Think, MOTHER JONES,
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/10/you-will-lose-your-job-to-a-robot-and-sooner-than-
you-think/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2018).
26. Robot Automation Will 'Take 800 Million Jobs by 2030'-Report, BBC (Nov. 29, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-42170100.
27. See RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE, supra note 1, at 36-47. Technological unemployment gen-
erally refers to "unemployment due to our discovery of means of economising the use of labour out-
running the pace at which we can find new uses for labour." JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, Economic
Possibilities for Our Grandchildren (1930), in ESSAYS IN PERSUASION 358, 364 (1963).
28. See infra notes 29-46 and accompanying text.
29. Lori G. Kletzer, The Question with AI Isn't Whether We'll Lose Our Jobs-It's How Much
We'll Get Paid, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 31, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/01/the-question-with-ai-isnt-
whether-well-lose-our-jobs-its-how-much-well-get-paid.
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among other benefits, this new technology is likely to result in job shifts and
the net creation of new jobs.3 0 In particular, experts argue that automation is
likely to increase productivity, which will thereby stimulate economic growth
and create more labor demand. 1 In addition to stimulating the expansion of
existing jobs, the technology will create new job opportunities in new and
existing sectors of the economy.3 2
For instance, a 2017 study by the McKinsey Global Institute forecasted
that although automation will likely displace up to one-third of the American
workforce by the year 2030, new and additional work will be created in the
future, globally, to offset the impact of automation. 33 Similarly, a study by a
well-known economist examines the effect of computer automation on occu-
pations from 1980 to 2013 and also concludes that automation will likely not
result in an overall job loss. 34
30. See Stevens, supra note 21, at 380; see also Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 8, at 154,
158-59 (noting that automation may create new types of jobs and that a majority of economists are
optimistic that automation will result in a net gain in jobs).
31. See JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., JOBS LOST, JOBS GAINED: WORKFORCE
TRANSITIONS IN A TIME OF AUTOMATION 1, 17 (2017); IAN STEWART ET AL., DELOITTE,
TECHNOLOGY AND PEOPLE: THE GREAT JOB-CREATING MACHINE (2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/
content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/finance/deloitte-uk-technology-and-people.pdf; Lewis D. Solo-
mon, The Microelectronics Revolution, Job Displacement, and the Future of Work: A Policy Com-
mentary, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 65, 71-72 (1987).
32. See JAMESMANYIKAETAL., supra note 31, at 1, 6; Solomon, supra note 31, at 71; STEWART
ET AL., supra note 31, at 7-10.
33. JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 31, at 11-12 (basing their conclusions on "two different
sets of analyses: one based on modeling of a limited number of catalysts of new labor demand and
automation ... and one using a macroeconomic model of the economy that incorporates the dynamic
interactions among variables"). This study also concludes that approximately 400 to 800 million in-
dividuals worldwide will need to find newjobs as a result of automation. Id. at 11. The study predicts
that new jobs will be created largely as a result of seven global trends that are a potential source of
labor demand. Id. at 55. These global trends include: (i) rising incomes in emerging economies and
the accompanying increase in consumer goods, health care, and education spending; (ii) aging popu-
lations creating an increased demand for health-care jobs; (iii) development and deployment of new
technology, creating additional employment in the technology sector; (iv) increased infrastructure in-
vestment creating new labor demand, especially in emerging economies; (v) increased spending on
residential and commercial buildings; (vi) increased investment in new energy sources and improving
energy efficiency, potentially increasing jobs in the energy sector; and (vii) marketization of currently
unpaid work. Id. at 55-64.
34. See James Bessen, How Computer Automation Affects Occupations: Technology, Jobs, and
Skills 1-3, 29-31 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Economics Working Paper No. 15-49, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2690435. Instead, the study indicates that auto-
mation of an occupation generally results in an increased demand for that job, often at the expense of
other occupations. See id. (empirically analyzing "detailed US occupational data and [using] a partial
equilibrium model that encompasses different ways [that] automation can affect occupations" to draw
its conclusions on the effect of automation on jobs (alteration in original)). But see Stevens, supra
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In addition, economists predict that automation is more likely to comple-
ment the tasks that humans do, rather than substitute the human workers,
which would further minimize any massive unemployment.3 5 Experts also
point to past technological revolutions, which ultimately led to net job crea-
tion, as evidence that this technological revolution will also create new jobs
and increase the demand for certain existing jobs more than it destroys other
jobs.3 6 Given this evidence, it is possible that this fear of massive unemploy-
ment may be unfounded.
On the other hand, other experts predict that robots will significantly dis-
rupt the labor market in the near future.3 7 An often-cited study estimates about
47% of total U.S. jobs are susceptible to displacement by robots and automa-
tion as a result of advancements in machine learning, artificial intelligence
and big data that allow cognitive tasks to be automated.3 8 Other studies gen-
erate similar results. For instance, a study conducted by the World Economic
Forum calculates that with respect to the global workforce, "current trends
could lead to a net employment impact of more than 5.1 million jobs lost to
disruptive labour market changes over the period 2015-2020."39
In addition to these studies, these experts argue that this technological
revolution is different than previous technological advances." They predict
that automation technology is likely to simultaneously invade most sectors of
the economy, from the industrial sector to the professional services sector,
whereas prior technological progress was largely confined to limited
note 21, at 371 (discussing why some technology experts have found this study to be misleading).
35. See Bianca Vazquez Toness, Five Questions for David Autor, UNDARK (Apr. 24, 2017),
https://undark.org/article/five-questions-for-david-autor/.
36. JANMESMANYIKAETAL.,supra note 31, at 4; Bessen, supra note 34, at 10, 29-31; JamesBes-
sen, Bill Gates Is Wrong That Robots and Automation Are Killing Jobs, FORTUNE (Feb. 25, 2017),
http://forune.com/20 17/02/25/bill-gates-robot-tax-automation-jobs/.
37. See STEWART ET AL., supra note 31, at 1 (citing a recent PEW Foundation survey indicating
that 48% of U.S. technology experts fall in this category); RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE, supra note
1, at 36-47; THE SECOND MACHINE AGE, supra note 1, at 142-46; FORD, supra note 2, at 61; Sumit
Paul-Choudhury, A Robot Tax Is Only the Beginning, 233 NEW SCIENTIST 25 (2017); Frey & Osborne,
supra note 4, at 254-55; Solomon, supra note 31, at 72.
38. Frey & Osborne, supra note 4, at 265-69.
39. WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE FUTURE OF JOBS: EMPLOYMENT, SKILLS AND WORKFORCE
STRATEGY FOR THE FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 3-4, 13 (2016), http://www3.wefo-
rum.org/docs/WEFFutureof Jobs.pdf (basing its conclusions on a dataset comprised of an extensive
survey of executives of the largest global employers in each target industry sector). However, this
study also finds that the actual disruption to the labor market will vary significantly depending on the
industry, region and occupation, as well as the actions taken today to minimize the labor disruption.
See id. at 8.
40. See FORD, supra note 2, at 33-51, 58-61.
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industries. 1 This change is principally due to advancements in artificial in-
telligence and machine learning that now enable automation of nonroutine,
cognitive, and high-skill tasks that were previously difficult to automate.4 2
Truck drivers, roofers, accountants, paralegals, line cooks, cashiers, credit an-
alysts, loan officers, and telemarketers are some ofjust a few well-known jobs
that are likely to be automated soon.4 3 In addition, technological progress is
accelerating at a rapid pace, which means that labor disruption is likely to
occur more quickly than in previous eras of technological change. 4 Finally,
the costs of computation have significantly declined, making the technology
more accessible and more attractive relative to labor." Thus, some experts
predict that this adoption of the newest technology will result in long-term,
wide-spread unemployment.4 6
In sum, it is too early to tell whether this time the fear of long-term struc-
tural unemployment is justified. Evidence supports both the optimists and the
pessimists. 7 Nevertheless, there is a general consensus that robots will
41. Id. at 58-61, 85-86; Oberson, supra note 4.
42. See RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE, supra note 1, at 51; FORD, supra note 2, at 86-104; Abbott
& Bogenschneider, supra note 8, at 145-47, 145 n.1; Frey & Osborne, supra note 4, at 258-60; Paul-
Choudhury, supra note 37; see also Stevens, supra note 21, at 378 (discussing how the learning ca-
pacity of modem robots provides them with certain human capabilities such as "perception, speech
recognition, and even vision").
43. See Frey & Osborne, supra note 4, at 255, 259-60; 9 Jobs Most Likely to Be Taken Over by
Robots, SALARY.COM, https://www.salary.com/9-jobs-taken-over-by-robots/ (last visited Oct. 14,
2018); Vindo Khosla, Technology Will Replace 80% of What Doctors Do, FORTUNE (Dec. 4, 2012),
http://forune.com/2012/12/04/technology-will-replace-80-of-what-doctors-do/; Bernard Marr, Sur-
prisingly, These 10 Professional Jobs Are Under Threat From Big Data, FORBES (Apr. 25, 2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bemardmarr/2016/04/25/surprisingly-these- 10-professional-jobs-are-
under-threat-from-big-data/#6c9b07077426; Sean Welsh, Are We Ready for Robotopia, when Robots
Replace the Human Workforce?, CONVERSATION (Aug. 31, 2016, 4:07 PM), https://theconversa-
tion.com/are-we-ready-for-robotopia-when-robots-replace-the-human-workforce-63653.
44. See RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE, supra note 1, at 28-29; Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra
note 8, at 153; see also Paul-Choudhury, supra note 37 (noting that, as opposed to previous technology
revolutions that only affected some sectors, the current robot revolution is enabling robots to fulfill
jobs in many sectors, including jobs requiring cognitive abilities).
45. See FORD, supra note 2, at 63-64, 68; Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 8, at 153; Frey &
Osborne, supra note 4, at 258; Paul-Choudhury, supra note 37; Stevens, supra note 21, at 378.
46. See MARTIN FORD, THE LIGHTS IN THE TUNNEL: AUTOMATION, ACCELERATING
TECHNOLOGY AND THE ECONOMY OF THE FUTURE 95-99, 131-38 (2009); Abbott & Bogenschneider,
supra note 8, at 146-47; William Hoke, Taxing Automatons, 88 TAX NOTES INT'L 11, 13 (2017);
Robert J. Shiller, Robotization Without Taxation?, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Mar. 22, 2017),
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/temporary-robot-tax-finances-adjustment-by-robert-
j--shiller-2017-03.
47. See THE SECOND MACHINE AGE, supra note 1, at 173-80; supra notes 28-46 and accompany-
ing text.
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significantly disrupt the labor market at least in the short-term." As history
has shown us, technology will inevitably create major upheavals in the labor
market as workers that are displaced from one sector have to adapt to find
employment in other sectors of the economy. 9 Thus, regardless of whether
or not the fear of long-term structural unemployment is justified, policymak-
ers need to act now to minimize the labor market turmoil that even short-term
job transitions inevitably create.
B. Increased Economic Inequality
As automation has increased, so has the public's fear that automation will
dramatically increase income and wealth inequality. This fear stems from the
belief that the growing automation of tasks previously performed by workers
will contribute to lower wages for workers and greater profits for those who
own the robots. 0 In other words, automation may accelerate the transfer of
income from workers to capital owners. Moreover, even among workers,
wages are likely to be unevenly distributed as low-skill jobs face downward
pressure relative to high-skill jobs. 1 With these wage shifts, automation may
lead to increasing wealth concentrated in a small portion of society.5 2
More specifically, if robots ultimately displace primarily low-skill jobs
and increase the demand for high-skill jobs, as recent waves of automation
have done, then income disparity is likely to increase.5 3 Numerous studies
48. See MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 31, at 12, 33, 48; OECD, AUTOMATION AND INDEPENDENT
WORK IN ADIGITALECONOMY 1(2016), https://www.oecd.org/els/emp/Policy%/`20brief%/20-%/2OAu-
tomation%20and%20Independent%20Work% 020in%/o20a%/o2ODigital%/`2OEconomy.pdf (noting that,
historically, technological developments resulted "in substantial job losses in the short term"); Abbott
& Bogenschneider, supra note 8, at 146-47, 159.
49. See FORD, supra note 2, at 57-58; MANYIKAET AL., supra note 31, at 1-6; Abbott & Bogen-
schneider, supra note 8, at 147.
50. See Tim Dunlop, What Is a Robot Exactly-and How Do We Make It Pay Tax?, GUARDIAN
(Mar. 12, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2017/mar/13/what-is-a-robot-ex-
actly-and-how-do-we-make-it-pay-tax.
51. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 21, at 21-23.
52. See THE SECOND MACHINE AGE, supra note 1, at 144-45; THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 305 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2014). Such significant inequality has an
undesirable effect on both society and the economy: it may result in social unrest, deepen the cycle of
poverty, and require increased social benefit transfers. See FORD, supra note 46, at 17-18. It may
also contribute to a stagnant economy by reducing the average citizen's purchasing power and there-
fore reducing consumption and the accompanying demand for goods and services. See id. at 153-54.
53. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 21, at 11-12; Joao Guerreiro et al., Should
Robots Be Taxed? 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23806, 2017),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w23806. For instance, in the late twentieth century, high-skilled workers
primarily benefitted from the introduction of the computer and the internet as demand for and wages
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predict that robots will primarily eliminate or depress the wages of low- and
medium-skill jobs. 4 By further polarizing jobs in this manner, advances in
automation threaten to widen "the wage gap between less-educated and more-
educated workers."55
Even if robots do not eliminate routine and low-skill jobs, workers in
these occupations are nevertheless likely to see a decline in wages. To com-
pete with robots who are more productive, do not take sick days, make fewer
errors, and are often less costly, workers in these positions will have to accept
lower wages to keep their jobs. 56 With robots able to perform many tasks
previously performed by humans, demand for this type of work will decrease,
thereby further pushing down wages and exacerbating economic inequality.57
Alternatively, it is also possible that the benefits of automation will not
go to labor at all, but rather will go to the owners of the robots-an even
smaller group than just high-skill workers.58 In fact, recent market trends in-
dicate that this is already occurring, as income and wealth has steadily shifted
away from labor and towards capital. 59 In the United States, the top one per-
cent already owns a substantial amount of the country's wealth and
of these workers increased at the expense of many routine, low-skill occupations. EXEC. OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, supra note 21, at 1.
54. See NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 21, at 2, 29; OECD, supra note 48, at 2 (con-
cluding that "workers with a lower level of education are at the highest risk of displacement. While
40% of workers with a lower secondary degree are in jobs with a high risk of job automation.").
55. NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 21, at 2; STEWART ET AL., supra note 31, at 10.
56. See Stevens, supra note 21, at 373; Guerreiro et al., supra note 53, at 2; Tom Simonite, Robots
Threaten Bigger Slice of Jobs in US, Other Rich Nations, WIRED (Nov. 28, 2017, 7:17 PM),
https://www.wired.com/story/robots-threaten-bigger-slice-of-jobs-in-us-other-rich-nations/.
57. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. The globalization of the economy, which has ena-
bled companies to outsource labor offshore, has already significantly contributed to this problem of
depressed wages and displaced U.S. workers. Andre Barbe & David Riker, The Effects of Offshoring
on Domestic Workers: A Review ofthe Literature 3, 7 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Economics Working
Paper Series No. 2017-10-A, 2017) (noting that there is a general consensus, and providing specific
examples, that offshoring labor has an overall negative effect on low-skilled labor, includingjob loss
and wage decrease).
58. See RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE, supra note 1, at 33-34; THE SECOND MACHINE AGE, supra
note 1, at 148; Jon Perry & Ted Kupper, A Detailed Critique of "Race Against the Machine", THE
DECLINE OF SCARCITY, http://declineofscarcity.com/?p=1037 (last visited Oct. 14, 2018); PIKETTY,
supra note 52, at 257-60. This phenomenon, where a select few acquire the majority of the benefits
of technological progress, has been referred to as "capital-biased technological change." THE SECOND
MACHINE AGE, supra note 1, at 148.
59. See THE SECOND MACHINE AGE, supra note 1, at 166; see also EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, supra note 21, at 21 (recognizing that "since 2000, ... the distribution of benefits going
to capital and labor have . . . been diverging").
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automation is likely to further increase that amount. 60
Furthermore, previous technological advancements have not resulted in
higher wages for the majority of American workers, despite higher productiv-
ity and economic growth.6 1 Instead, capital owners, not labor, benefitted to a
large extent from the economic benefits attributable to this increased produc-
tivity.6 2 Similarly, empirical evidence also suggests that the higher produc-
tivity generated by robots may not result in higher wages for workers. 63 Thus,
those who own the robots, a form of capital, are likely to be the ones to pri-
marily benefit from the innovation, growth, and productivity that this new
technology brings. 64 Because capital is generally owned by the wealthy, this
would further widen the gap between the top one percent and the rest of the
population. 65
Ultimately, automation's effect on income distribution and economic
welfare will depend on the types of jobs eliminated, whether the demand for
labor in other fields increases, whether labor productivity transforms into
wage increases, and the types of public policies and institutions we have in
place. 66 But, in any case, policy intervention will need to play a part in
60. See RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE, supra note 1, at 33-34; PIKETTY, supra note 52, at 248
tbl.7.2.
61. See Josh Bivens & Lawrence Mishel, ECON. POLICY INST., UNDERSTANDING THE HISTORIC
DIVERGENCE BETWEEN PRODUCTIVITY AND A TYPICAL WORKER' SPAY: WHY IT MATTERS AND WHY
IT'S REAL 3-4 (2015), https://www.epi.org/files/2015/understanding-productivity-pay-divergence-fi-
nal.pdf; EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 21, at 21 (estimating that "since the late 1970s,
the bottom 90% of households have seen their income fall from two-thirds of the total to about one
half of the total share of U.S. income," and observing that "productivity growth did not translate to
higher real wages for low-income and even middle-income American workers").
62. Lawrence Mishel, THE WEDGES BETWEEN PRODUCTIVITY AND MEDIAN COMPENSATION
GROWTH 1, 5-7 (Econ. Policy Inst., Issue BriefNo. 330, 2012), https://www.epi.org/files/2012/ib330-
productivity-vs-compensation.2012-04-26-16:45:37.pdf; THE SECOND MACHINE AGE, supra note 1,
at 145.
63. See Daron Acemoglu & Pascual Restrepo, Robots and Jobs: Evidence from US Labor Markets
1, 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23285, 2017), http://www.nber.org/pa-
pers/w23285.pdf (predicting that the addition of "one more robot per thousand workers reduces ag-
gregate employment to population ratio by about 0.34 percentage points ... and wages by about 0.5
percent").
64. See Catherine Clifford, Elon Musk Says Robots Will Push Us to a Universal Basic Income-
Here's How It Would Work, CNBC (Nov. 18, 2016, 11:28 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/18/
elon-musk-says-robots-will-push-us-to-a-universal-basic-income-heres-how-it-would-work.html; see
also FORD, supra note 46, at 153-54.
65. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
66. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 21, at 1-2, 22-23; see also MANYIKA ET AL.,
supra note 31, at 12 (discussing factors that determine how automation affects a country's work force,
including wage levels, economic and productivity growth, demographics, and economic sectors prev-
alent in the country).
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addressing the potential negative ramifications of the rapid growth in robotics
and artificial intelligence automation. 67
C. Loss of Tax Revenue
The rise in robotics also raises concerns that governments will lose a sub-
stantial amount of much-needed tax revenue as more human workers are dis-
placed by machines. 68 This concern stems from the fact that under our current
tax system, a significant source of federal and state tax revenues is borne by
workers, not capital. 69
In particular, a worker's earnings are subject to multiple levels of taxa-
tion.70 First, wages are subject to payroll taxes,71 which are often remitted
directly to the government through wage withholding or quarterly estimated
tax payments. 72 These employment taxes are comprised of: (1) a 12.4% tax
on wages up to $128,400 (for 2018) to provide old age, survivors, and disa-
bility insurance ("OASDI" or "Social Security tax"); and (2) a 2.9% tax on an
uncapped amount of wages to provide Medicare or hospital insurance ("Med-
icare tax"). 73 If the worker is an employee, then the worker pays half of these
taxes, while the employer pays the other half.>< If the worker is self-employed,
67. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 21, at 1-2; RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE,
supra note 1, at 36-39, 64-70; OECD, supra note 48, at 1, 4; Stevens, supra note 21, at 369, 380; Tim
De Chant, Navigating the RobotEconomy, PBS (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/next/
tech/automation-economy/.
68. See Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 8, at 150; Sami Ahmed, Cryptocurrency & Robots:
How to Tax and Pay Tax on Them, 69 S.C.L. REv. 697, 699 (2018); Hoke, supra note 46, at 12;
Oberson, supra note 4; Gideon Rosenblatt, The Robot Tax Fallacy: AnthropomorphizingAutomation,
VITAL EDGE (June 5, 2017), http://www.the-vital-edge.com/robot-tax/; Matt Simon, Who WillPay for
the Future if Not the Robots?, WIRED (May 30, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/05/
will-pay-future-not-robots/; Linda A. Thompson, Rise ofRobots: Boon for Companies, Tax Headache
for Lawmakers, BNA.CoM (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.bna.com/rise-robots-boon-n57982084077/.
69. See Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 8, at 156; Rosenblatt, supra note 68 ("[R]oughly
65% of total US federal tax dollars depend on wage-based income.").
70. See Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 8, at 156. Labor income is generally also indirectly
subject to sales tax because workers generally use their income to buy products and services that are
subject to sales tax. See id.; Simon, supra note 68.
71. I.R.C. § 3101(a)-(b) (2018).
72. I.R.C. § 3102(a) (2018) (requiring that the payroll tax be collected by the taxpayer's employer
from the taxpayer's wages "as and when paid").
73. See I.R.C. §§ 3101(a)-(b)(1), 3111(a)-(b) (2018). Technically, these taxes apply only to "cov-
ered" wages. I.R.C. § 3111; see I.R.C. § 3121 (2018) (defining "wages"). The taxable wage base
subject to the Social Security tax ($128,400 for 2018) is adjusted annually for inflation. Contribution
and Benefit Base, SSA.gov, https://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/cbb.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2018).
74. See I.R.C. §§ 3101(a)-(b)(1), 3111(a)-(b).
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the worker pays the entire tax without any employer assistance.75 In addition
to these taxes, high-income earners are subject to an additional Medicare tax
of 0.9% on wages that exceed $250,000 (if married filing jointly), resulting in
a combined 3.8% Medicare tax on wages over the threshold. 76
Capital income is not subject to these payroll taxes.77 Instead, the net
investment income78 of high-income individuals is subject to an additional tax
of 3.8% ("unearned income Medicare tax" 79 or "Section 1411 surtax")." As
currently structured, this Section 1411 surtax can potentially capture income
generated by robots and other capital investments to the extent that qualified
net investment income exceeds a threshold amount."
Currently, the federal government receives more than $1 trillion in reve-
nue annually, or approximately one-third of its total tax revenue, from
75. I.R.C. § 1401(a)-(b)(1) (2018). However, the worker is entitled to deduct a portion of the tax
paid on his or her income tax return. See I.R.C. § 164(f)(1) (2018).
76. I.R.C. §§ 1401(b)(2)(A)(i), 3101(b)(2)(A); supra text accompanying note 73. The employer
is not subject to the additional Medicare tax. See I.R.C. § 3111(b). This additional Medicare tax is
effective for taxable years beginning in 2013 and applies to both employees and self-employed indi-
viduals. I.R.C. §§ 140 1(b)(2)(A), 310 1(b)(2). For a single or head of household taxpayer, the thresh-
old is $200,000. I.R.C. §§ 1401(b)(2)(A)(iii), 3101(b)(2)(C).
77. For the tax imposed on certain capital income, including investment income of individuals, see
I.R.C. § 1411 (2018).
78. For Section 1411 purposes, net investment income generally consists of the sum of specific
sources of gross income and net gains from the disposition of property, minus specific deductions
allocable to the gross income or net gains. See I.R.C. § 1411(c). It includes: (1) "gross income from
interest, dividends, annuities, royalties, and rents, other than such income which is derived in the or-
dinary course of' qualified trades or businesses; (2) "other gross income from" qualified trades or
businesses; and (3) net gain from "the disposition of property other than property held" in a qualified
trade or business. I.R.C. § 1411(c)(1)(A). For purposes of Section 1411, a qualified trade or business
is a trade or business that either constitutes "a passive activity ... with respect to the taxpayer" or
consists of "trading in financial instruments or commodities." I.R.C. § 141 1(c)(2). In addition, net
investment income also generally includes any item of gross income from the investment of working
capital, any net gain attributable to the investment of working capital, and interest, dividends, annui-
ties, royalties and rents derived from a trade or business of trading in financial instruments or com-
modities even ifthe taxpayer actively participates in that business. See I.R.C. §§ 469(e)(1), 1411 (c)(3)
(2018).
79. Despite being commonly referred to as the "unearned income Medicare tax" or "unearned in-
come Medicare contribution," this tax is not technically a Medicare tax because revenues generated
from the tax are not dedicated to the Medicare Trust fund. See I.R.C. § 1411.
80. See I.R.C. § 1411(a)-(b).
81. See supra note 78. The 3.8% surtax applies to the lesser of (i) the individual's net investment
income for the taxable year or (ii) the excess of modified adjusted gross income for the taxable year
over a threshold amount. I.R.C. § 141 1(a)(1). The threshold amount is $250,000 for married taxpayers
filing joint returns, $125,000 for married taxpayers filing separate returns, and $200,000 for all other
individuals. I.R.C. §1411(b). This tax also applies to certain estates and trusts. I.R.C. § 1411(a)(2).
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employment taxes.8 2 Because they do not eam wages, robots and other forms
of technology are not subject to the brunt of these taxes.83 Consequently, a
reduction in the number of humans employed will inevitably result in a reduc-
tion in the amount of employment taxes collected by the government." Given
that employment taxes comprise an important source of federal tax revenue
and help finance Social Security and certain Medicare benefits, a decline in
these taxes have the potential to significantly affect the government's ability
to continue to fund its expenditures."
Even though the government will not have to make retirement or Medi-
care insurance disbursements to robots, the government will nonetheless face
significant budgetary pressures. The current Social Security system is funded
on a pay-as-you go basis, which means that as the number of human workers
declines, less payroll tax revenue will be available to fund the currently retired
and disabled workers.8 6 Furthermore, government expenditures are likely to
grow if robots displace human workers because additional benefit programs
will be necessary to support the unemployed. 7 The current system does not
technically accumulate payroll taxes in a Social Security Trust Fund, but ra-
ther uses the funds to pay benefits to current beneficiaries and treats any sur-
plus as an additional source of tax revenue for the federal government to spend
82. BUREAU OF THE FISCAL SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINAL MONTHLY TREASURY
STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS AND OUTLAYS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FOR FISCAL YEAR
2016 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 2016, AND OTHER PERIODS 34 tbl.9 (2016), https://www.fiscal.treas-
ury.gov/fsreports/rpt/mthTreasStmt/mts0916.pdf. Employment taxes represent the second-largest
source of federal revenues after individual income taxes. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2017 TO 2027, at 9-11 (2017), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/I 15th-
congress-2017-2018/reports/52370-outlookI.pdf; see BUREAU OF THE FISCAL SERVICE, supra, at 34
tbl.9. States also receive a significant source of tax revenue from employment taxes on labor income,
which states often use to help fund state unemployment and disability insurance. CHAD STONE &
WILLIAM CHEN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, INTRODUCTION TO UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE 7 (July 30, 2014), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/12-19-02ui.pdf;
Who Actually Pays for Workers' Compensation?, DISABILITY SECRETS, https://www.disabilityse-
crets.com/workmans-comp-question-20.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2018).
83. See Simon, supra note 68; supra notes 68-70, 77 and accompanying text.
84. See Simon, supra note 68; supra notes 68-70, 77 and accompanying text.
85. See Joint Comm. on Taxation, Technical Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the "Rec-
onciliation Act of 2010," as Amended, in Combination with the "Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act" 134 (Mar. 21, 2010), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3673; su-
pra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
86. See David John, Misleading the Public: How the Social Security Trust Fund Really Works,
HERITAGE FOUND. (Sept. 2, 2004), https://www.heritage.org/social-security/report/misleading-the-
public-how-the-social-security-trust-fund-really-works.
87. See Clifford, supra note 64; supra note 52.
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for other purposes."8 Accordingly, a reduction in the number and wages of
employed workers will significantly affect not only the government's finan-
cial ability to finance Social Security and Medicare but also other government
programs that can potentially help those negatively affected by the automation
revolution.
In addition to payroll taxes, the tax code also imposes an income tax on a
worker's wages, which comprises the largest source of federal tax revenue for
the U.S. government.8 9 Worker's earnings are subject to federal income tax
rates ranging from 10% to 39.6%, with the new Tax Act temporarily lowering
the top rate to 3 7 % beginning in 2018.90 The majority of states also subject
this same income to a state income tax.91
Conversely, other sources of income are subject to a much smaller income
tax burden. In particular, income derived from business profits and invest-
ments is generally taxed on a net basis, unlike wages which are taxed on a
gross basis. 92 This form of income often also benefits from numerous and
generous tax deductions, including accelerated depreciation and research and
development tax preferences, which further reduce the effective tax rate on
this income. 93 Income derived from capital gains and qualified dividends ben-
efit from a preferential tax rate of up to 20%, as compared to the 37% tax rate
imposed on labor and some types of investment income. 94 Holders of this
88. John, supra note 86. In other words, "[t]he Social Security trust fund is merely an accounting
device" that keeps tracks of the payroll taxes paid by taxpayers and the payroll tax collections that the
federal government uses for other purposes. See id.
89. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 82, at 9, 10 tbl.1-1; see CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, OPTIONS
FOR REDUCING THE DEFICIT: 2017 TO 2026, at 119 (2016), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/52142-budgetoptions.pdf (showing that, for the fiscal
year 2016, the government collected 47% of its total tax revenues from individual income taxes and
34% from payroll taxes). Of the individual income taxes collected, approximately two-thirds were
levied on wage income, as opposed to investment income, thereby resulting in wage income generating
about 65% of total federal tax revenues. See Rosenblatt, supra note 68.
90. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11001, 131 Stat. 2054, 2054-59 (2017) (codified
at I.R.C. § 1 (2018)). The new Tax Act reduces the rates across all brackets: beginning in 2018, the
individual income tax rates will be 10%, 12%, 22%, 24%, 32%, 35%, and 37%. Id. However, this
reduction in tax rates is only temporary and is set to revert back to 2017 tax rates in 2026. Id.
91. MORGAN SCARBORO, STATE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATES AND BRACKETS FOR 2018, at
1-2 (TAx FOUND., Fiscal Fact No. 576, 2018), https://files.taxfoundation.org/20180315173118/Tax-
Foundation-FF576-1.pdf.
92. See I.R.C. § 162(a) (2018) (allowing a deduction for "all the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business"); Soled & Thomas, supra
note 8, at 9.
93. See I.R.C. §§ 38(a)-(b), 41(a), 168 (2018).
94. See I.R.C. § 1(h), (). This income may also be subject to the 3.8% § 1411 surtax. I.R.C.
§ 1411(a)(1), (c)(1) (2018).
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type of income also benefit from a time value of money perspective, 95 because
they may often defer, and sometimes even completely escape, paying taxes on
capital gains.9 6 Deferral also enables their money to grow at a lower rate in
the corporate form prior to paying it out as dividends.97
Moreover, the recent Tax Act extends additional benefits to holders of
these types of income. For instance, the Tax Act reduces the maximum cor-
porate tax rate from 35% to 21%.98 In addition, business income earned in a
partnership, sole proprietorship or other pass-through entity can benefit from
an additional 20% income deduction. 99 Although labor income earned in this
entity form can also benefit from the 20% deduction, this deduction does not
benefit employees and phases out for many businesses generating primarily
labor income. 10 0 Significantly, the Tax Act also further reduces the tax burden
95. For a review of the concept of time value of money, see Glenn S. Daily & David A. Ludgin,
Understanding the Time Value ofMoney, N.J. LAW, July 1994, at 12.
96. See I.R.C. § 1001 (2018). Significantly, the realization principle provides that gains derived
from capital assets generally are not subject to tax until the occurrence of a realization event, thereby
potentially allowing appreciation to remain untaxed for many years. See I.R.C. § 1001(a)-(b). Other
provisions also allow for deferral or complete exemption of taxes on capital gains, such as the like-
kind exchange provisions, the step-up in an asset's basis at the death, and others. See, e.g., I.R.C.
§§ 1014(a), 1031(a) (2018).
97. Compare supra note 90 and accompanying text (providing the tax rates for individuals, the
highest of which is 37% after 2018), with infra 98 and accompanying text (providing that the corporate
tax rate is 21o%).
98. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13001(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2096 (2017) (codified
at I.R.C. § 11(b) (2018)). According to many economists, employees are unlikely to be the ones to
benefit from this reduction in the corporate tax rate; instead, shareholders are more likely to bear the
incidence of corporate taxation and realize these benefits. See Kimberly A. Clausing, In Search of
Corporate Tax Incidence, 65 TAxL. REv. 433, 437, 465-66 (2012); Mann, supra note 8 (manuscript
at 17-18). Moreover, even though corporate income is also subject to a second level of tax when the
business profits are distributed to the corporation's shareholders, see I.R.C. § 1(h), the combined tax
rate imposed on this income is often lower than the 37% rate imposed on individual income because
of the benefits of deferral, see supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text, and the fact that some share-
holders are tax exempt. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)(B) (providing a 0% tax rate on dividends for taxpayers
whose taxable income falls below a certain level). The Tax Act also eliminates the Corporate Alter-
native Minimum Tax. See §12001(a), 131 Stat. at 2092 (codified at I.R.C. § 55(a) (2018)).
99. See § 11011(a), 131 Stat. at 2063-70 (codified at I.R.C. § 199A (2018)).
100. See I.R.C. § 199A(f)(1)(A) (2018) (limitingthe deductionto partners and shareholders ofpart-
nerships and S-Corporations, respectively). Specifically, the deduction phases out for taxpayers with
taxable income in excess of $315,000 (if married filing jointly) that are engaged in "any trade or busi-
ness involving the performance of services in the fields of health, law, . . . accounting, actuarial sci-
ence, performing arts, consulting, athletics, financial services, brokerage services, or any trade or busi-
ness where the principal asset of such trade or business is the reputation or skill of 1 or more of its
employees," or any trade or business that "involves the performance of services that consist of invest-
ing and investment management, trading, or dealing in securities, . . .partnership interests, or com-
modities." I.R.C. §§ 199A(d)-(e), 1202(e)(3)(A) (2018).
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on capital income by allowing businesses to deduct the full cost of depreciable
assets in one year instead of recapturing the costs over several years.1 0 1
In summary, the above discussion suggests that if the amount of labor
income declines, so will the tax base. Even though automation is likely to
increase productivity and economic growth, most of that profit is likely to be
captured as either business profits or capital gains, both of which are subject
to a much lower tax burden. Currently the corporate tax contributes only 9%
of federal tax revenues, 10 2 and this number is not likely to significantly in-
crease even if the majority of the excess profits generated by automation are
captured in the corporate form. Therefore, if machines displace a significant
number of workers, even for the short-term, governments will likely be unable
to maintain current levels of spending, which would put further pressure on
government budgets and widen the fiscal gap.10 3 The technology revolution
is likely to magnify this problem because this downward trend in tax revenues
would come at a time when governments are facing increased spending de-
mands to sustain workers displaced by technology.10 4 Thus, in light of the
acceleration of automation and the growing shift from labor income towards
capital income, it is critical that we rethink our current tax system and how we
fund welfare spending and other social transfers of wealth.
III. THE ROBOT TAX
With growing public concern over the loss of jobs, increasing economic
inequality, and declining tax revenues, there have been calls around the world
for a robot tax. Section A defines "robot tax."10 Section B critically analyzes
the robot tax proposal and highlights the many negative implications that re-
sult from such a tax. 106 It concludes that, although a robot tax as currently
contemplated should not be pursued, we should consider tax policy as one tool
101. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13201, 131 Stat. at 2105-08 (codified at
I.R.C. § 168(k) (2018)). However, the amount of the deductionphases downbeginning in 2023. Id.
102. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 89, at 119.
103. See Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 8, at 168; Ross Campbell, Technology, Automation
and Maintaining the Public Finances, ICAEW (Aug. 30, 2017), https://ion.icaew.com/talkaccount-
ancy/b/weblog/posts/technology-automation-and-maintaining-the-public-finances; Frank, Automa-
tion Could Cause America to Lose 350% ofIts Tax Base in the Next 20 Years, 60 SECOND STAT. (Feb.
28, 2017), https://www.60secondstatistics.com/automation-could-cause-america-to-lose-35-of-its-
tax-base-in-the-next-20-years/; Simon, supra note 68.
104. See Ahmed, supra note 68, at 730-31; Obserson, supra note 4.
105. See infra Section I.A.
106. See infra Section III.B.
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to address the threats raised by the automation revolution. 117
A. What is a "Robot Tax"?
A "robot tax," also referred to as an "automation tax," is essentially a tax
on companies that use robots or automated technologies that replace human
workers.108 When humans perform work, that work is subject to both income
and payroll taxes, whereas the same work performed by a robot is not subject
to the same level of tax.10 9 A robot tax seeks to level the playing field and tax
robots comparably to the humans that they are replacing.110 According to its
proponents, the general idea behind the tax is to help protect jobs against au-
tomation by increasing the cost of robots relative to humans and slowing down
the adoption of this technology." It also attempts to protect the tax base and
provide governments with revenues that can be used to support or retrain dis-
placed workers, foster the creation of new jobs, and provide other social ben-
efits to mitigate economic inequality. 112
The first serious proposal to tax the robots originated in the European
Union.1 13 European lawmakers recommended treating robots as "electronic
persons" for purposes of tax and social security contributions."' Under this
proposal, the economic income generated by the robot for a company would
107. See infra Section II.B.4.
108. See Mady Delvaux (Rapporteur), Comm. on Legal Affairs, Report with Recommendations to
the Commission on CivilLaw Rules on Robotics, at 4, 2015/2103 (INL) (Jan. 27, 2017), http://www.eu-
roparl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A8-2017-
0005+0+DOC+PDF+VO//EN; Anna Massoglia, The Rise ofRobot Taxes, BNA.COM (Aug. 29, 2017),
https://www.bna.com/rise-robot-taxes-b73014463832/; James Walker, San Francisco Could Start
Taxing Robots to Save Jobs, DIGITAL J. (Aug. 25, 2017), http://www.digitaljournal.com/tech-and-sci-
ence/technology/san-francisco-could-start-taxing-robots-to-save-jobs/article/50093 1.
109. See supra Section II.C.
110. See Kevin J. Delaney, The Robot that Takes Your Job Should Pay Taxes, Says Bill Gates,
QUARTZ (Feb. 17, 2017), https://qz.com/911968/bill-gates-the-robot-that-takes-your-job-should-pay-
taxes/; Massoglia, supra note 108.
111. See Delaney, supra note 110 (quoting Bill Gates as saying, "[y]ou ought to be willing to raise
the tax level and even slow down the speed" of automation); Massoglia, supra note 108.
112. Delvaux, supra note 108, at 4, 15; Joyce E. Cutler, Rise of Machines to Spark Rise of San
Francisco Taxes?, BNA.COM (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.bna.com/rise-machines-spark-
n57982085273/; Delaney, supra note 110; Roisin Kiberd, A French Presidential Candidate Wants to
Tax Robots to Save Human Workers, MOTHERBOARD (Feb. 3, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://mother-
board.vice.com/en-us/article/xyvvgj/a-french-presidential-candidate-wants-to-tax-robots-to-save-hu-
man-workers.
113. See Delvaux, supra note 108, at 4, 15; Shiller, supra note 46.
114. See Delvaux, supra note 108, at 4, 15, 18; Massoglia, supra note 108.
296
[Vol. 46: 277, 2019] Taxing the Robots
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
be subject to a similar tax to the one currently imposed on labor income."'
Because robots do not pay taxes, the company using the robot would be re-
sponsible for the payment of this tax. 116
Although the European Parliament ultimately rejected this recommenda-
tion on February 16, 2017, the following day, Bill Gates stated his support for
a similar robot tax in the United States.11 7 Similarly, a San Francisco politi-
cian, concerned about the growing revenue gap and wealth inequality brought
about by automation, proposed that the City of San Francisco adopt an auto-
mation tax to replace taxes lost to automated jobs. 1" According to her pro-
posal, companies would pay payroll taxes on machines based on the payroll
tax that the job automation replaced. 119 Meanwhile, across the world, South
Korea introduced what has been called the first "robot tax." 120 The provision
does not directly impose a tax on robots, but rather reduces tax incentives for
investments in automation technology. 121 Thus, it is not technically a robot
tax, but seeks to achieve similar policy goals.
These calls for a robot tax are only the beginning of the robot tax discus-
sion. As the automation revolution further accelerates and its impact is felt
across society, the calls for a robot tax are likely to increase as well. 122
115. See Delvaux, supra note 108, at 15.
116. Id.; see Paul-Choudhury, supra note 37.
117. Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 8, at 149 & n.19; see Massoglia, supra note 108; Tech.
News, European Parliament Calls For Robot Law, Rejects Robot Tax, REUTERS (Feb. 16, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-robots-lawmaking/european-parliament-calls-for-robot-
law-rejects-robot-tax-idUSKBN15V2KM.
118. See Cutler, supra note 112; Massoglia, supra note 108.
119. Cutler, supra note 112; Massoglia, supra note 108.
120. Cara McGoogan, South Korea Introduces World's First Robot Tax', TELEGRAPH (Aug. 9,
2017, 12:54 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/08/09/south-korea-introduces-
worlds-first-robot-tax/.
121. Massoglia, supra note 108; McGoogan, supra note 120. The tax legislation reduces the three
to seven percent deduction in corporate taxes currently available to employers who invest in automa-
tion to a two percent deduction. Massoglia, supra note 108.
122. See Massoglia, supra note 108; Brandon Vigliarolo, South Korea Robot Tax'Is No Tax atAll;
It's a Warning of Looming Automation Crisis, TECHREPUBLIC (Aug. 11, 2017, 7:21 AM),
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/south-korea-robot-tax-is-no-tax-at-all-its-a-waming-of-loom-
ing-automation-crisis. More recently, British politician, Jeremy Corbin, also strongly expressed the
need to address the challenges of automation, suggesting that this include the introduction of a robot
tax in the United Kingdom. See Adam Becket, Jeremy Corbyn 's Labour Conference Speech in Full,
BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 27, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/full-text-of-jeremy-corbyns-labour-
conference-speech-2017-9; Kari Paul, Why Robots Should Pay Taxes, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 28,
2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-robots-should-pay-taxes-2017-09-12/print.
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B. Critique of the Robot Tax
The robot tax, as currently contemplated, gives rise to practical issues and
negative policy implications. As one commentator accurately noted, "[T]he
idea that we can tax a robot like we tax a human is a vast over-simplifica-
tion." 123 The following discussion highlights four of the biggest issues that a
robot tax presents.
1. Definitional Issues
One of the main questions that a robot or automation tax raises is: How
do we define a "robot" for these purposes? The question is more complicated
than robot tax proponents make it seem. 124 Is a "robot" any type of machine
that replaces a human job with automation? Does the definition include
bots-robots programmed to perform tasks online? Does the definition ne-
cessitate physical qualities, or can it include intangible software or algorithms
that allow a computer to work as a doctor, lawyer, or architect? The European
Union's robot tax proposal defined a robot as having the following character-
istics: (i) acquires "autonomy through sensors and/or by exchanging data with
its environment" and the trading and analyzing of the data, (ii) is self-learning
through experience and interaction, (iii) has a physical support, and (iv) adapts
its behaviors and actions to its environment. 125 But is this the right definition
for tax purposes? This definition likely excludes many types of labor-displac-
ing automation, while at the same time including many forms of labor-en-
hancing technologies, thereby undermining the goals of the robot tax. 12 6 Any
definition that is ultimately adopted needs to be clear, practicable, and justifi-
able. Thus far, it seems nearly impossible to achieve these goals, especially
123. Rosenblatt, supra note 68.
124. For a discussion of some of the difficulties in defining the term "robot," see Daniel Hemel,
Should Robots Be Subsidized?, MEDIUM (Aug. 17, 2017), https://medium.com/whatever-source-de-
rived/should-robots-be-subsidized-i18909e lfdb64; Kiberd, supra note 112; Simon, supra note 68.
125. Delvaux, supra note 108, at 8.
126. See Hoke, supra note 46, at 14 (implying, based on the comments of Professor Shu-Yi Oei,
that robot characteristics are on a continuous spectrum, which leads to difficulties in determining how
much agency, physical form, and autonomy is necessary to constitute a robot; may encourage robot
developers to design their systems to be just beyond the line; and will likely give rise to complex facts
and circumstances litigation); Kiberd, supra note 112; Robert J. Kovacev, The Challenges ofAdmin-
istering a Robot Tax, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/de-
tail.aspx?g=d55a305f-989b-400e-9b32-547f6a95fbb0; Lawrence Summers, Picking on Robots Won't
Deal With Job Destruction, WASH. POST (Mar. 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opin-
ions/picking-on-robots-wont-deal-with-job-destruction/2017/03/05/32091f08-004b-11e7-8ebe-
6eodbe4f2bca story.html; Walker, supra note 108.
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as technology, jobs, and business models continue to evolve. 127
Regardless of how we define a robot, another big question that arises is:
Why are we taxing this particular type of capital asset but not taxing other
types of capital assets? 128 A tax on robots is essentially a tax on the capital
employed by the business that utilizes the robot. If we single out robots for
this additional tax, then other capital assets are given a tax preference-but is
this the right policy result? If the goals of the robot tax are to increase gov-
ernment revenues while minimizing labor market disruption, then the robot
tax should encompass all technology that increases automation and produc-
tivity at the expense of human workers. Moreover, if robots are in fact in-
creasing productivity, especially in relation to other capital investments, then
why do we want to discourage their use? Finally, as discussed above, a sig-
nificant contributor to the declining government revenues at a time of in-
creased automation is that the tax law favors capital over labor. 129 Thus, sin-
gling out robots for taxation does not get at the root of the problem. Instead,
we need to rethink our taxation of capital income.1 3 0 This type of change has
the potential to more effectively address the job disruptions, economic ine-
quality, and government budget deficits exacerbated by the automation revo-
lution.
2. Innovation Issues
In addition to the definitional and line-drawing issues raised by a robot
tax, this type of tax is also likely to hinder innovation.13 1 A robot tax would
increase the cost of robots, therefore reducing the incentive for companies to
127. See Steve Cousins, Is a "Robot Tax" Really an "Innovation Penalty"?, TECH CRUNCH,
https://techcrunch.com/2017/04/22/save-the-robots-from-taxes/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2018); Hemel,
supra note 124; Kovacev, supra note 126 (observing that "[t]here is enough trouble sorting out whether
a human worker is an employee or an independent contractor. It is not difficult to imagine the contro-
versy and ambiguity that would result from trying to sort out whether a particular machine or algorithm
is a taxable robot."); Shiller, supra note 46.
128. Cousins, supra note 127; Summers, supra note 126.
129. See supra Section II.C.
130. See infra Sections IV.A-B.
131. See Ahmed, supra note 68, at 732; Edward D. Kleinbard, Reimagining Capital Income Taxa-
tion 5 (Oxford Univ. Ctr. for Bus. Taxation, Working Paper No. 1524, 2015); California Tax on Ro-
bots, Automation Equals a Tax on Innovation, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Dec. 4, 2017),
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/opinion/editorials/sd-robot-tax-innovation-jane-kim-
20171201 -story.html; Cousins, supra note 127; Sam Reynolds, A Robot Tax Will Not Solve Automa-
tion Problems, IND. DAILY STUDENT (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.idsnews.com/article/2017/02/ro-
bot-tax-wont-help; Summers, supra note 126.
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innovate and penalizing technological progress and productivity. 13 2
New technology is often a major driver for economic growth and pro-
gress.1 3 3 Advancements in robotics, automation, and artificial intelligence are
likely to do the same, as this technology dramatically increases productivity
and improves the quality of goods and services produced.1 3 4 As noted by the
National Science and Technology Council, "R&D on Al ha[s] already begun
reaping major benefits to the public in fields as diverse as health care, trans-
portation, the environment, criminal justice, and economic inclusion."13 5
Given the numerous benefits that automation provides for society, deterring
the development of artificial intelligence and related technologies will ulti-
mately harm, rather than improve, overall social welfare. Moreover, taxing
robots would negatively impact a country's international competitive position,
which would drive production abroad and further exacerbate the loss of jobs,
growing inequality, and lost tax revenues. 13 6 Therefore, even though we need
to address the negative implications of automation, it is essential to do so in a
manner that does not impede innovation, but rather harnesses the benefits of
automation.
3. Tax Avoidance Issues
A robot tax also may be subject to significant tax avoidance techniques,
thereby limiting its effectiveness at achieving its goals. This is partly because
a robot is relatively mobile. Automation of jobs is often created by software
that does not require a physical structure, which allows many of these systems
to be hosted in the "cloud" or on the internet and to be accessed remotely. 137
132. See Cousins, supra note 127. Economists generally agree that an optimal tax system should
not hinder productivity. See Peter A. Diamond & James A. Mirrlees, Optimal Taxation and Public
Production I: Production Efficiency, 61 AmvI. ECON. REV. 8, 24-25 (1971). But see Guerreiro et al.,
supra note 53, at 1, 35 (concluding that a robot tax is optimal when there is partial automation because
the tax can help increase the wages of routine workers who would otherwise be displaced by ma-
chines).
133. RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE, supra note 1, at 8; see EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra
note 21, at 1; Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 8, at 153.
134. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 21, at 1; NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra
note 21, at 1, 5; Delvaux, supra note 108, at 44; Cousins, supra note 127.
135. NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 21, at 1 (alteration in original).
136. See Hoke, supra note 46, at 15; Reynolds, supra note 131; Summers, supra note 126.
137. See Ahmed, supra note 68, at 730; Campbell, supra note 103. However, this is not always the
case: some "robots" do require a physical structure, such as driverless cars. See Shiller, supra note
46. Moreover, the extent of this issue significantly depends on how robots are defined for purposes
of the robot tax. See supra Section II.B. 1.
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In many instances, this makes it possible to move the "robot" to a no- or low-
tax jurisdiction.1 3 8 Because a robot tax generally creates a tax at the source
(i.e., the location of the robot), in the absence of substantial international tax
reform, a company, with sufficient advance planning, can potentially avoid
the robot tax altogether. 13 9 Even if a company is unable to relocate a robot,
the adoption of a robot tax may result in companies relocating to other juris-
dictions that do not impose a robot tax.140
Also, because a robot tax is essentially a tax on a specific type of corpo-
rate profits, it would further incentivize the use of aggressive tax planning
methods that exist today.' A robot tax is also likely to add more complexity
into our tax system. 14 2 With additional complexity, there is an increased risk
of tax non-compliance, as companies may not know how much tax they are
required to pay, and of enforcement difficulties, as tax authorities may not be
able to verify the accuracy of the asserted tax liability.14 3
4. Design, Implementation, and Administrative Issues
Finally, even if the above concerns can be addressed, actually designing,
implementing, and administering a robot tax creates significant challenges.
These difficulties occur because a robot does not actually earn income or pay
taxes." This gives rise to the question: What is the tax base for the robot tax
and how would it be measured? Various ways to implement a robot tax have
been suggested, but each face substantial hurdles.'
For instance, governments may tax the increased profits generated by a
labor-displacing robot by subjecting the "imputed hypothetical salary the ro-
bots should receive from equivalent work done by humans" to the same type
138. See Orly Mazur, Taxing the Cloud, 103 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 60-63 (2015); Campbell, supra note
103; Kovacev, supra note 126.
139. See Thompson, supra note 68; Ahmed, supra note 68, at 730. Under current law, it is unclear
where the robot is generating value: Is it at the location of the hardware, the software learning algo-
rithms, or somewhere else? See Ahmed, supra note 68, at 730. These components may be located in
different jurisdictions. See id. Thus, this determination is important because it affects whether or not
the income is taxable in the United States. See id.
140. Thompson, supra note 68.
141. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
142. See Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 8, at 170.
143. See Thompson, supra note 68; Kovacev, supra note 126.
144. Paul-Choudhury, supra note 37; Rosenblatt, supra note 68.
145. Yanis Varoufakis, A Tax on Robots?, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.pro-
ject-syndicate.org/commentary/bill-gates-tax-on-robots-by-yanis-varoufakis-2017-02.
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of income and payroll taxes as labor income. 14 6 The robot would either have
a legal personality, similar to that of a business organization, and be subject
to the tax directly, or the owner of the robot would be liable for the tax. 147
This approach is unworkable in practice. Calculating how many human
workers a robot displaces is incredibly problematic.4 In practice, robots of-
ten take over tasks before taking over an entire job, which makes finding a
link between the robot and the displaced worker difficult. 14 9 Sometimes, au-
tomation displaces some workers but creates demand for new workers to com-
plete a different task or performs completely new jobs that a human worker
never performed previously. 15 Alternatively, a robot may complement, rather
than displace a human worker, but differentiating between job-enhancing and
job-displacing robots is often difficult."1 Given these issues, it is "nearly im-
possible to prove a direct correlation between the implementation of automa-
tion technology and the net loss ofjobs."1 5 2 Moreover, even if such correla-
tion were possible or not required to trigger the tax, determining the robot's
hypothetical salary would create its own set of issues.1 5 3
A similar, but perhaps even more problematic approach, would be to im-
pose the robot tax on the amount of income generated by the use of automa-
tion.15 4 This raises the question: how do we measure the profits or value cre-
ated by the robot or automation program? Robots and human workers often
work together to complete a job and jointly contribute to the value pro-
duced." To allocate the income between the different labor and robot
146. Oberson, supra note 4; see Hoke, supra note 46, at 14.
147. See Hoke, supra note 46, at 14; Oberson, supra note 4; Celia Luterbacher, Should Robots Be
Taxed for Stealing Jobs?, SwIss INFO (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/business/auto-
mated-workforcetax-robots-for-stealing-jobs/42976564.
148. See Thompson, supra note 68.
149. See Rosenblatt, supra note 68.
150. See Cousins, supra note 127; Kovacev, supra note 126; Varoufakis, supra note 145.
151. Noah Smith, What's Wrong With Bill Gates' Robot Tax, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 28, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-02-28/what-s-wrong-with-bill-gates-robot-tax.
152. Cousins, supra note 127; see supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
153. See Varoufakis, supra note 145. For instance, the robot's hypothetical salary could potentially
be based on the displaced employees' last annual salary amounts. Id. This gives rise to questions,
such as: How would this number be adjusted over time? Id. What salary would be imputed to the
robot when it performs a new job or when it creates new jobs for human workers? See Cousins, supra
note 127; Varoufakis, supra note 145. Alternatively, the tax base could be calculated based on the
ratio of corporate profits or revenues to the company's gross employee wage expenses. See Abbott &
Bogenschneider, supra note 8, at 171-72. This type of tax is also problematic because it penalizes
labor productivity and may be subject to manipulation. See id. at 171-72.
154. See Kovacev, supra note 126.
155. See Cousins, supra note 127; Rosenblatt, supra note 68.
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components would create significant compliance challenges. 15 6 Similarly,
multiple capital assets, not all of which are "robots," often work together to
contribute to the value produced, but there is no clear-cut method to assign
profits to the robot components. 1 7
Alternatively, governments may consider using the ratio of the com-
pany's revenues to the number of employees to compute the tax base for the
robot tax." Under this approach, as the ratio of sales to the workforce in-
creases, so would the tax.15 9 Because productivity is measured as the ratio of
economic outputs to labor input,160 this approach effectively penalizes produc-
tivity, which is necessary for GDP growth. 161 It also encompasses more than
just robots, including any type of innovation that increases productivity, even
non-labor displacing technology, which seems contrary to the goals of the ro-
bot tax.
Overall, these proposals involve substantial elements of arbitrariness and
complexity in implementation, likely increasing compliance and administra-
tive burdens on companies and tax authorities. 1 6 2 Moreover, given the sub-
stantial implementation difficulties, unjustified line-drawing, negative impli-
cations for innovation and economic growth, and enforcement challenges,
among other issues, a robot tax is not an effective way to address the threat of
massive unemployment, rising inequality, or declining tax revenues. 163
Hence, a robot tax is not the answer. The remainder of this article discusses
why we need more fundamental tax reform that is not about robots and pro-
poses several options that can better address the issues raised by the rise in
robotics.
156. See Kovacev, supra note 126; supra note 155 and accompanying text.
157. See Rosenblatt, supra note 68; Thompson, supra note 68.
158. See Oberson, supra note 4.
159. See id.
160. Labor Productivity and Costs: Frequently Asked Questions, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.,
https://www.bls.gov/lpc/faqs.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2018).
161. See Hemel, supra note 124.
162. See, e.g., Varoufakis, supra note 145. Other approaches have also been suggested, but they
are just as problematic. See Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 8, at 169-73; Oberson, supra note
4. For instance, another approach to taxing robots would be to levy a tax on a lump sum amount
representing the robot owner's ability to pay the tax at the time of the sale of the robot to the owner.
Oberson, supra note 4. This approach also raises the issue of how to objectively calculate the lump
sum amount, as well as how to separate out the robot from other capital assets into which it may be
incorporated. See Varoufakis, supra note 145.
163. See Cousins, supra note 127; Paul, supra note 122; Smith, supra note 151; Why Taxing Robots
Is Not a Good Idea, ECONOMIST (Feb. 25, 2017), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-econom-
ics/2017/02/25/why-taxing-robots-is-not-a-good-idea.
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IV. ADDRESSING THE ROBOT THREAT
The recent wave of robot tax proposals reveals a lot about the challenges
of this new automation era. In particular, the robot tax discussion highlights
the job disruption, economic inequality, and government revenue difficulties
that are likely to arise as our economy continues to shift away from labor and
towards a capital-oriented economy. By imposing additional taxes on certain
types of capital investments, the robot tax essentially seeks to address these
issues by minimizing the taxation disparity that our tax system creates be-
tween capital and labor income. Although a robot tax is the wrong tool for
addressing these critical issues, it accurately recognizes the need to reexamine
the U.S. tax code and the benefits it grants to capital over labor. 164
This idea that our tax law does not properly tax capital income is not a
new issue. But, as our economy continues to evolve to one that increasingly
relies on robots and other capital assets, the urgency with which we need to
reform the taxation of capital income has become more pressing. 165 This Part
suggests a range of policy options to promote labor, enhance revenue collec-
tions, and improve economic equity, while also encouraging advances in tech-
nology. 166 These proposals seek to rebalance our tax system, moving away
from an emphasis on the taxation of labor income toward a more neutral tax
system as between labor and capital income.
Section A focuses on ways to reform our current payroll tax system to
address the distortionary effect the tax system has on the use of capital in place
of labor. 167 It also considers potential additional sources of tax revenues to
offset the declining tax revenues collected from human workers. Section B
focuses on ways to reform our current income tax system to take into account
the increased use of capital and decreased use of labor to generate profits. 168
Finally, Section C emphasizes the need for additional tax and non-tax policy
initiatives to take advantage of these technological innovations, while also
minimizing their negative effects. 16 9
164. See Ahmed, supra note 68, at 729-32; Paul, supra note 122; Thompson, supra note 68.
165. See Hoke, supra note 46, at 11-12; Oberson, supra note 4; Thompson, supra note 68.
166. See infra Sections IV.A-C.
167. See infra Section IV.A.
168. See infra Section IV.B.
169. See infra Section IV.C.
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A. Modify the Payroll Tax
The current employment tax system subjects labor income and a limited
amount of capital income to employment taxes.170 This Section proposes
modifying the payroll tax on labor income and expanding the Section 1411
surtax on capital income to address some of the issues raised by the new tech-
nological revolution.
1. Payroll Tax on Labor Income
The purpose of the payroll tax is primarily to fund the Social Security and
Medicare federal benefit programs.17 1 These programs provide economic ben-
efits to retired or disabled workers and their survivors and help fund the na-
tion's health insurance program for people age 65 or older. 172 However, the
current system is unsustainable. The effectiveness and continued viability of
these social insurance programs have been criticized on numerous grounds. 173
The current automation era contributes to these concerns in several re-
gards. First, because labor income bears a substantial majority of the employ-
ment taxes, the decline in human workers resulting from automation will sig-
nificantly reduce the funding available for these social insurance programs,
which are already under financial pressure.174 Second, because the Social Se-
curity Trust Fund is essentially an accounting mechanism, rather than an ac-
tual trust that accumulates funds to finance its intended purpose, a decline in
payroll taxes not only affects the solvency of the program, but also affects the
funds available to the government to spend for other purposes. 1 7 5 With
170. See supra notes 68-80 and accompanying text.
171. John Olson, What Are Payroll Taxes and Who Pays Them?, TAX FOUND. (July 25, 2016),
https://taxfoundation.org/what-are-payroll-taxes-and-who-pays-them/.
172. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., PUB. No. 05-10024, UNDERSTANDING THE BENEFITS 1, 17 (2018); How Is
Medicare Funded?, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/about-us/how-is-medicare-funded
(last visited Oct. 18, 2018). Medicare also provides health care benefits to individuals with certain
disabilities that are under the age of 65 years, disabled children of certain wage earners, and individuals
with permanent kidney failure. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., supra, at 17-18.
173. See, e.g., ROMINA BOCCIA, A SOCIAL SECURITY PRIMER FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION:
REFORM NEEDED Now (2017), https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/BG3186.pdf; Pe-
ter A. Diamond & Peter R. Orszag, A Summary ofSaving Social Security: A BalancedApproach (MIT
Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. 04-21, 2004), https://ssrn.com/abstract=544244; Updating Social
Security for the 21st Century: 12 Proposals You Should Know About, AARP, https://www.aarp.org/
work/social-security/info-05-20 12/future-of-social-security-proposals.html (last updated Oct. 18,
2018).
174. See BOCCIA, supra note 173, at 1-3; Oberson, supra note 4; Varoufakis, supra note 145.
175. See John, supra note 86.
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automation threatening to disrupt the labor market, even for a short-term du-
ration, government expenditures for these and other benefit programs are
likely to increase to help support the displaced workers. 176 Finally, by sub-
jecting labor income to a heavier tax burden than capital income, the payroll
tax system potentially artificially accelerates the shift from labor to capital.1 7 7
In particular, the current employment tax system requires employers to
pay half of the payroll tax imposed on their employees' earnings, which in-
creases the cost of human workers relative to capital equipment.1 78 To avoid
this additional cost and administrative burden, employers may be incentivized
to use robots or other capital equipment in place of human workers, even when
it is not otherwise economically efficient to do so. 1 7 9 This distortion can po-
tentially further exacerbate any disruption of the labor market, increase the
need for social benefit programs, and decrease the funding available to finance
these programs.18 0 As one commentator observed, "The better machines be-
come at substituting for human labor, the bigger negative effect any tax or
mandate will have on human employment."181 Thus, with this new automa-
tion era, an employment-based tax system no longer makes sense.
To address these issues, one option is to completely repeal the payroll tax
system and replace it with a less labor-focused tax system that could better
fund social insurance programs. 18 2 Eliminating the payroll tax would reduce
the hiring disincentive created by the tax system.1 83 It would also potentially
improve workers' economic welfare by increasing the after-tax wages of
workers and creating a tax system that treats labor income more in parity with
capital income." Abolishing the payroll tax would also help address
176. See Oberson, supra note 4.
177. See FORD, supra note 2, at 277-78; Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 8, at 163-66; supra
Section II.C.
178. See FORD, supra note 2, at 277-78; Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 8, at 163-64; supra
notes 70-83 and accompanying text.
179. See THE SECOND MACHINE AGE, supra note 1, at 239-40; Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra
note 8, at 150, 163-64; Soled & Thomas, supra note 8, at 7-8. But see Michael Simkovic, The
Knowledge Tax, 82 U. CHI. L. REv. 1981, 2027 (2015) (noting that "most economists believe that the
incidence falls primarily on labor income and reduces wages").
180. See FORD, supra note 2, at 277-78; supra Part II.
181. THE SECOND MACHINE AGE, supra note 1, at 240.
182. See FORD, supra note 2, at 277-78; Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 8, at 168, 171; supra
infra notes 183-89 and accompanying text.
183. See FORD, supra note 2, at 277-78; Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 8, at 171 (noting
that "a repeal of the employer contributions to the Social Security and Medicare systems" would put
humans and automated workers on the same level, in terms of wage taxes, in an employer's eyes).
184. See FORD, supra note 2, at 277-78; supra notes 70-83 and accompanying text.
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difficulties inherent in the current system of differentiating between labor in-
come and capital income-a task that has become more complex over time."'
It would also help address the ability of high-income taxpayers to disguise
labor income as capital income, a problem that the Tax Act of 2017 greatly
exacerbates. 18 6 However, this proposal also has its limitations: specifically, it
would not stop the trend away from labor and towards capital, solve income
inequality, or increase government tax revenues (in fact, it would significantly
decrease tax revenues), and may not be politically feasible at this time.187
Another option is to exempt employers from making employment tax
payments on the wages and salaries of their employees.8 8 Modifying the pay-
roll tax in this manner would reduce the cost and burden on employers for
hiring human workers, thereby potentially reducing the tax law's role in in-
centivizing employers to use capital over labor. 18 9 Of course, human workers
are still more costly than robots in that they require health insurance, sick
days, vacation days, and are unable to work continuously. 190 But this modifi-
cation of the payroll tax system would at least reduce an artificial incentive to
use capital at the expense of labor.
Modifications can also be made to the payroll tax system to help provide
relief to workers who face declining wages as a result of increased automation.
For instance, one possibility is to exempt a certain amount of labor income
185. See also Karen C. Burke, Exploiting the Medicare Tax Loophole, 21 FLA. TAX REV. 570 (2018)
(describing numerous ways to disguise labor income as capital income in order to minimize the tax-
payer's Medicare tax liability); Patricia E. Dilley, Breaking the Glass Slipper: Reflections on the Self-
Employment Tax, 54 TAX LAW. 65 (2000) (noting the difficulties in distinguishing between various
forms of income).
186. See Burke, supra note 185.
187. See Part II. However, because the receipt of Medicare benefits does not generally vary with
earnings, this common argument against modifying the payroll tax also has its weaknesses. See Burke,
supra note 185, at 608; Willard B. Taylor, Should Payroll Taxes Be Repealed?, 148 TAx NOTES 213,
214 (2015) (demonstrating how the link between payroll taxes and benefits received is weakening).
Moreover, many of "[t]he complications of current law ... are required by the underlying imperative
to tie Social Security benefit eligibility to earnings." See Dilley, supra note 185, at 92. Thus, there
are reasons that this option should be considered despite political opposition. See supra notes 183-86
and accompanying text.
188. See Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 8, and accompanying text. This change would also
require making a parallel change with respect to self-employed taxpayers; specifically, an equivalent
amount of tax on self-employed earnings would have to be exempt from taxation. See supra notes
71-75 and accompanying text (explaining how self-employed workers pay the wage taxes that would
otherwise have been paid by an employer).
189. See FORD, supra note 2, at 277-78; Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 8, at 171.
190. See Will Gish, What Is the Average Employer's Costs for Personnel?, SMALLBUSINESS.
CHRON.COM, https://smallbusiness.chron.com/average-employers-costs-personnel-15641.html (last
visited Oct. 18, 2018); supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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from payroll taxes. 191 Alternatively, Congress could consider re-enacting a
universal, refundable wage tax credit on a capped amount of every worker's
earnings. 192 These types of measures would decrease the marginal tax on la-
bor earnings, thereby increasing a worker's after-tax income.
Each of the modifications to the payroll tax system proposed above would
result in a significant decline in government revenues and deprive Social Se-
curity and Medicare of much-needed revenues. 193 As a result, adopting any
of these changes would also require the introduction of a new tax or taxes that
can generate substantial revenues to fund Social Security, Medicare, or any
replacement social insurance program. 194 This would provide policymakers
with an opportunity to introduce a tax that does not solely rely on labor in-
come. A tax that relies on a broader tax base could help minimize the current
distortionary effect of the payroll tax system on employers' use of labor in-
come, maximize the optimal allocation of investments, and provide some re-
lief to workers. 195 Despite these potential benefits, eliminating such a
191. See Michael J. Graetz, The Tax Reform Road Not Taken-Yet, 67 NAT'L TAX J. 419, 431-32
(2014) (proposing a payroll tax credit that would effectively eliminate payroll taxes for certain low-
income families). In other words, Congress could introduce a zero-rate bracket for payroll tax pur-
poses to help lower-income households. See id.
192. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1001, 123 Stat.
115, 309-12 (repealed 2014) (enacting the "Making Work Pay Tax Credit," which authorized a re-
fundable tax credit equal to 6.2% of a worker's wages up to $400 for single taxpayers and $800 for
married taxpayers, and phased out for higher-income taxpayers); Len Burman, A Tax Credit to Give
Middle-Class Workers a Raise, FORBES (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/belt-
way/2017/08/03/a-tax-credit-to-give-middle-class-workers-a-raise/#ddd7852 1aef2 (proposing imple-
mentation of a broad-based VAT to finance a "100 percent refundable tax credit on the first $14,000
of every worker's earnings," and the "cap on the credit would be indexed to a rolling average of Gross
Domestic Product"). In 2011, Congress replaced the "Making Work Pay Tax Credit" with a temporary
payroll tax holiday, which reduced employee payroll tax contributions for all workers by two percent
for a period of two years. See Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-96, § 1001, 126 Stat. 156, 158-59 (extending the payroll tax holiday through the end of 2012);
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-312, § 601(a)(2), (c), 124 Stat. 3296, 3309 (enacting the payroll tax holiday forthe calendaryear
2011). Although popular with the public, this measure was also criticized for providing too many
benefits to high-income taxpayers relative to the "Making Work Pay Tax Credit" and for its temporary
nature. See CHUCK MARR & BRIAN HIGHSMITH, LETTING PAYROLL TAX CUT EXPIRE WOULD SHRINK
WORKER PAYCHECKS AND DAMAGE WEAK ECONOMY 4-5 (2011), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/de-
fault/files/atoms/files/9-7-11 tax.pdf.
193. See David Harrison, Social Security Expected to Dip Into Its Reserves This Year, WALL
STREET J. (June 5, 2018, 6:03 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/social-security-expected-to-dip-
into-its-reserves-this-year-1528223245.
194. See Graetz, supra note 191 (proposing the use of a 12.9% VAT tax to cover, among other
things, payroll tax credits); Burman, supra note 192; supra note 193 and accompanying text.
195. See Graetz, supra note 191; John S. Treu, Less is More: Applying a Modified Reasonable
Compensation Standard to Eliminate the Inconsistencies Among the Payroll Tax Bases and the Net
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significant source of government revenue and introducing a new tax that does
not link the payment of tax to the receipt of future benefits is also likely to
face significant political opposition. 19 6 Nevertheless, because the current tax
system relies so heavily on labor income, regardless of whether or not these
payroll tax changes are adopted, additional sources of tax revenue will be nec-
essary to support existing social insurance programs and to support future
government spending. 197
One option for raising additional tax revenues includes a consumption
tax-such as a value added tax-which is already a major source of revenue
for governments around the world. 198 Another option is to tax wealth by re-
vising the tax base to include measures of wealth, increasing the tax rate im-
posed on income based on the taxpayer's wealth, or by taxing transfers of
wealth. 199 Although not likely to be a substantial source of revenue, other
ways to raise supplemental revenues include using technology to design, im-
plement, and impose more Pigovian taxes on negative externalities, such as a
carbon tax.20 0 In addition, as I argue below, reforming the taxation of capital
income is another potential and necessary source of tax revenues.
2. Payroll Tax on Capital Income
Traditionally, only an individual's earned income was subject to payroll
Investment Income Tax Base Under the Affordable Care Act, 92 NEB. L. REv. 586, 625 (2014); Bur-
man, supra note 192. This type of change would also help address difficulties inherent in the current
system of differentiating between labor income and capital income-a task that has become more
complex over time. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. It would help address the ability of
high-income taxpayers to disguise labor income as capital income, a problem that the Tax Act of 2017
greatly exacerbates. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
196. See Dilley, supra note 185, at 69-71.
197. See id. at 100 (proposing an income surtax on the self-employed to compensate for the repeal
of self-employed taxes); supra Section II.C.
198. See Graetz, supra note 191; OECD, INTERNATIONAL VAT/GST GUIDELINES 4 (2017),
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/intemational-vat-gst-guidelines_9789264271401-en; Burman,
supra note 192.
199. See Ari D. Glogower, Wealth and the Income Tax (Ohio State Pub. Law, Working Paper No.
368, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2841479. Our tax system currently taxes a taxpayer's annual
income but not the taxpayer's wealth. See id.; supra Section II.C. A proposed method to tax both
income and wealth within the current income tax is by having a taxpayer's wealth affect the rate of
tax imposed on the taxpayer's annual income. See Glogower, supra. Although our tax system tech-
nically taxes transfers of wealth through the use of gift and estate taxes, in reality, most taxpayers do
not pay these taxes due to a substantially high exclusion amount. See I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2010, 2503
(2018).
200. See THE SECOND MACHINE AGE, supra note 1, at 224-26; FORD, supra note 2, at 272.
309
[Vol. 46: 277, 2019] Taxing the Robots
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
taxes. 20 1 However, with the introduction of Section 1411, the tax law now
also imposes a similar tax on certain capital income of high-income individu-
als. 20 2 Although not technically a Medicare tax,20 3 the Section 1411 surtax is
an important component of any payroll tax discussion because it is intended
to subject an individual's unearned income to the same 3.8% Medicare tax
that applies to the individual's wages or self-employment earnings. 20 4 It can
also be viewed as a potential-though not required-financing source for
Medicare.
In reforming our tax system to account for the shift away from labor to
capital, the Section 1411 surtax is a step in the right direction. 20 5 It ensures
that the income generated by robots and other capital investments is at least
partially subject to a comparable tax already imposed on labor income. 20 6 This
is beneficial because it makes a step towards neutralizing the tax system's
preference for capital income and is a source of additional government reve-
nues, which will grow over time as the dollar threshold amounts are not in-
dexed for inflation. 20 7 The Section 1411 surtax also encompasses all capital
income, rather than singling out a robot's income, which makes it a more
workable and equitable tax than that proposed by current robot taxes. 20 8 For
these reasons, if the current employment tax system continues, this provision
should not be repealed as recently contemplated by lawmakers. 20 9
201. See Burke, supra note 185, at 572-73; supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text (explaining
the payroll tax's application to earned income and its inapplicability to capital gains).
202. See I.R.C. § 1411 (2018). The effective Section 1411 surtax imposed on net investment income
is technically higher than the parallel Medicare tax imposed on labor income because half of the Med-
icare tax, or 1.45%, is deductible by the employer or self-employed individual in calculating taxable
income, whereas no portion of the Section 1411 surtax is deductible. See I.R.C. §§ 162, 164(f), 1411
(2018); Edward D. Kleinbard, Corporate Capital and Labor Stuffing in the New Tax Rate Environment
16 (USC Gould Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-5, 2013), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2239360##.
203. See Burke, supra note 185, at 572 & n.4 (noting that the revenue generated from the Section
1411 surtax is not dedicated to the Medicare Trust fund-instead, the revenue is part of general tax
revenues).
204. Taylor, supra note 187, at 213; see JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 85, at 134-35.
205. See Burke, supra note 185, at 608-09.
206. See id.; Taylor, supra note 187, at 213.
207. See I.R.C. § 1411(b) (2018); FORD, supra note 2, at 277-78; Burke, supra note 185, at 608-
09.
208. See I.R.C. § 1411(c); supra Sections III.B.1, 4.
209. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010);
Burke, supra note 185, at 571-72. However, Section 1411 should be modified to limit the tax planning
techniques available to taxpayers to avoid the Section 1411 surtax and the comparable Medicare tax
on labor income. See Burke, supra note 185, at 620-21. To address these concerns, Congress should
expand "the definition of net investment income to include gross income and gain from any trades or
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However, the Section 1411 surtax also has its limitations and, as such, is
not a perfect tool for subjecting capital income to an equivalent amount of
payroll taxes. First, because the Section 1411 surtax only applies a 3.8% tax
to net investment income if the taxpayer's "modified adjusted gross income"
is above a certain threshold, capital income will often not be subject to any
Medicare-type tax.210 As a result, some capital income completely escapes
this additional tax, whereas an equivalent amount of labor income would be
subject to a cumulative payroll tax of up to 15.3%.211 Second, net investment
income earned in a corporation taxed under subchapter C of the Code (a "C-
corporation") is not subject to the Section 1411 surtax until it is distributed to
its shareholders. 212 This deferral of the tax enables taxpayers to benefit from
a time value of money perspective. 213 Although this is a relatively small ad-
vantage, it becomes a bigger issue if the Section 1411 surtax rate increases. 214
businesses of an individual that is not otherwise subject to employment taxes." U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2017 REVENUE
PROPOSALS 170 (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-
Explanations-FY2017.pdf; see Burke, supra note 185, at 608. Alternatively, Congress could amend
§ 1402(a)(I3) to subject self-employment taxes to the distributive shares of partnership, LLC and S
corporation income tax of owners who materially participate in the business. See I.R.C. § 1402(a)(I3)
(2018); U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra, at 170-71. Although Congress considered amending
§ 1402 to close this loophole in recent tax reform discussions and included such language in the House
Bill, it unfortunately had to abandon any provision relating to Social Security as a result of the Byrd
rule. See Erik Wasson, What You Need to Know About the Byrd Rule, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 14, 2017,
9:59 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-14/how-the-byrd-rule-will-shape-u-s-
tax-overhaul-quicktake-q-a.
210. See I.R.C. § 1411(a)-(b); Tony Nitti, Overview ofthe New 3.8% Investment Income Tax, Part
1, FORBES (Apr. 26, 2013, 1:16 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonynitti/2013/04/26/over-
view-of-the-new-3-8-investment-income-tax-part-1/#3 98dd806606 1.
211. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. Wages up to $128,400 would be subject to
both a 12.4% Social Security tax and a 2.9% Medicare tax, and wages in excess of $128,400 but less
than $200,000 ($250,000 for married filingjointly) would be subject to a 2.9% Medicare tax. See id.
212. See Kleinbard, supra note 202, at 18-19.
213. Id. at 19 & n.35 (explaining that the shareholder has the benefit of "eaming a tax-free return
on the compounding of each year's . . . deferred tax for the period of the deferral"). In addition, the
Section 1411 tax "does not apply to the fraction of a C corporation's pretax earnings paid in corporate
income tax," further reducing the effective rate of the Medicare tax imposed on capital income. Id. at
19 & n.34. However, labor income earned in corporate form also benefits from this same advantage
and may incentivize taxpayers to convert labor income into corporate income to avoid any compensa-
tory tax on the portion of pretax earnings used to pay the corporate income tax. See id. at 18-19.
214. See id. at 19-20. Other limitations also exist especially with respect to the tax planning oppor-
tunities available to taxpayers to avoid the earned and unearned income Medicare tax. See Burke,
supra note 185, at 576. In particular, the current law encourages owner-employees of S-corporations
(and some other pass-through entities) to understate their labor income and allows income derived
from robots and other capital investments to completely escape the Medicare tax. See id. at 577, 584-
88; Kleinbard, supra note 202, at 16-18. Many of these types of tax planning opportunities arise
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Despite these limitations, the earned and unearned income Medicare tax,
together, capture a significant amount of corporate income attributable to
high-income earners. Thus, if the payroll tax system remains, the Section
1411 surtax should not be repealed. 215 Instead, the issues described above
should be taken into account in modifying the payroll tax provisions to further
minimize the tax disparity between capital and labor income.2 16 For instance,
one option is to consider increasing the Medicare tax on earned and unearned
income above a certain dollar threshold, although, doing so would increase
the advantage of operating in the corporate form and deferring distributions
to shareholders. 2 17 Another option is to increase the deductibility of the Med-
icare tax imposed on earned income and continue to deny the deductibility of
the Medicare tax on unearned income. 218 This change would increase the ef-
fective tax rate preference for wages and self-employment income, thereby
making it more comparable to the effective Medicare tax rate imposed on cap-
ital income. Ultimately, regardless of the method of reform, replacing our
current employment tax system with a tax system that taxes capital income
more in panty with labor income is necessary in this current economy.
because the unearned income Medicare contribution surtax does not apply to all unearned income
above a specified threshold. See Burke, supra note 185, at 606-09. Instead, Section 1411 only im-
poses the surtax on net investment income, which excludes most types of active business income. See
I.R.C. § 1411(c); Burke, supra note 185, at 608. This exception enables business income earned in a
pass-through entity to circumvent the 3.8% Medicare tax on wages and the 3.8% tax on net investment
income. See Burke, supra note 185, at 606-09. Thus, an owner, who is also an employee of the
business, can structure his or her operations in a manner to completely avoid the Medicare tax imposed
on both earned and unearned income. See OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY,
GAPS BETWEEN THE NET INVESTMENT INCOME TAX BASE AND THE EMPLOYMENT TAX BASE 4-5
(2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/NIIT-SECA-
Coverage.pdf; Burke, supra note 185 (providing a comprehensive discussion of the various Medicare
tax loopholes available to owner-employees).
215. See Burke, supra note 185, at 576. But see Alvin D. Lurie, Case for Repealing Investment
Income Tax, SBCA, http://sbca.net/case-for-repealing-investment-income-tax/ (last visited Oct. 19,
2018).
216. See Burke, supra note 185, at 608; infra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text. High income employees are already subjected
to an additional 0.9% Medicare tax on wages exceeding $250,000 (if married filingjointly). See supra
notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 202 (explaining the deductibility of the earned Medicare tax, and the nonde-
ductibility of § 1411 taxes, by employers and the self-employed).
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B. Tax Capital Income
The current income tax system significantly favors capital income over
labor income. 2 19 It grants numerous tax preferences that essentially subsidize
capital relative to labor.220 The most prominent of these preferences is a re-
duced tax on capital gains and dividend income. 2 21 Other favorable tax pro-
visions include deductions in the form of expensing and accelerated deduc-
tions,222 the tax credit for certain research and development expenses, 223 and
various provisions that allow capital owners to defer their gains. 224 The recent
2017 tax legislation provides additional benefits to holders of capital income
through measures such as large tax cuts for corporations, additional deduc-
tions for certain pass-through entities, and immediate expensing of qualified
capital purchases. 225
Contrary to this favorable tax treatment, labor income bears a heavier tax
burden. It is generally taxed on an annual basis at ordinary income tax rates
and any preferential tax treatment it receives is limited and substantially less
than that received by capital income. 226 The following discussion argues that
219. See Soled & Thomas, supra note 8, at 4-19 (discussing why the tax law evolved into a system
that places a greater tax burden on labor income than business, investment, and capital income).
220. See generally Phyllis C. Taite, Saving the Farm or Giving Away the Farm: A CriticalAnalysis
ofthe Capital Gains Tax Preferences, 53 SAN DIEGOL. REV. 1017 (2016) (providing a comprehensive
overview of the history of capital gains tax preferences and their role in wealth and income inequality);
supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
221. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(11) (2018).
222. See I.R.C. §§ 168(a), (k), 179 (2018).
223. See I.R.C. § 41 (2018).
224. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1001 (2018) (allowing capital owners to defer gains until they dispose of the
asset or otherwise engage in another realization event); I.R.C. § 1031(a) (2018) (providing for the
deferral of gains on the like-kind exchange of qualified property). Some provisions even enable capital
owners to avoid taxation entirely. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1014 (2018) (providing a step-up in basis at death,
which eliminates any inherent gain); I.R.C. § 121 (2018) (providing a conditional exclusion of a fixed
amount of gain from the sale of a principal residence).
225. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
226. For instance, tax provisions that benefit labor income include the exclusion of certain fringe
benefits, the exclusion of scholarship and fellowship income, the deduction for tuition-related ex-
penses, tax credits for higher education, the provision of various retirement benefits, and the earned
income tax credit, among other limited provisions. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 25A, 32, 117, 119, 125, 127,
132, 219, 221, 408A (2018). However, the 2017 Tax Act further limited some of the benefits previ-
ously granted to labor-in particular, it repealed the moving expense deduction. See Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11049, 131 Stat. at 2088-89. The repeal of this deduction may hinder
a worker from finding employment in a new city, which is particularly important given the increased
potential job loss associated with the rise in automation. See Mann, supra note 8 (manuscript at 1-2,
4). The 2017 Tax Act also eliminated miscellaneous itemized deductions, which included a deduction
for unreimbursed employee business expenses. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97,
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the rise in automation requires us to tax capital income.
1. The Automation Justification
The question of whether or not to tax capital income is a controversial
and constantly debated area of tax policy. 227 On the one hand, there is the
view that neither capital income nor wealth should be taxed. 228 This view is
supported by the traditional optimal capital taxation literature, which con-
cludes that taxing capital income creates more distortions than exclusively
taxing labor income. 22 9 According to this economic theory, taxing labor cre-
ates a distortion away from work and towards leisure, whereas taxing capital
distorts both the number of hours worked and the amount saved or invested. 230
Because taxation of capital results in a double distortion, it more adversely
impacts economic growth.23 1 Moreover, taxing capital income may further
exacerbate these distortions because capital is more mobile than labor and,
therefore, may be more responsive to taxation. 232
On the other hand, there is the view that capital income should be taxed
§§ 11011, 11045, 131 Stat. at 2063-71, 2088. The loss of this deduction may hinder an employee
from seeking additional education or training in her current trade or business when that training is
unreimbursed by her employer. See Mann, supra note 8 (manuscript at 4).
227. See Lily Kahng, Who Owns Human Capital?, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 607, 607-09 (2017);
Sanchirico, supra note 12, at 867; Daniel N. Shaviro, Uneasiness and Capital Gains, 48 TAX L. REV.
393, 393-95 (1993); Aghion, supra note 12, at 2.
228. See Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax
over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1413, 1415-19 (2006); David Gamage, How Should
Governments Promote Distributive Justice?: A Framework for Analyzing the Optimal Choice of Tax
Instruments, 68 TAX L. REV. 1, 4-7 (2014); Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Supply ofPublic Goods and
the Distortionary Cost of Taxation, 49 NAT'L TAX J. 513, 513 (1996); Aghion, supra note 12, at 2-3;
GEORGE R. ZODROW, SHOULD CAPITAL INCOME BE SUBJECT TO CONSUMPTION-BASED TAXATION?
1-4 (2006), https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/Research/361a2912/rp_2006_002.pdf.
229. See A.B. Atkinson & J.E. Stiglitz, The Design of Tax Structure: Direct Versus Indirect Taxa-
tion, 6 J. PUB. ECON. 55, 56, 65-66 (1976); Gamage, supra note 228, at 4-8; Kaplow, supra note 228,
at 513-15; Aghion, supra note 12, at 2-3. This is often referred to as the "double-distortion" argument.
Gamage, supra note 228, at 4.
230. See IMF, Tackling Inequality, FISCAL MONITOR 14 (Oct. 2017), https://www.imf.org/en/Pub-
lications/FM/Issues/2017/10/05/fiscal-monitor-october-2017; LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF
TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 122-33 (2008); Atkinson & Stiglitz, supra note 229, at 56, 65-
66; Peter Diamond & Emmanuel Saez, The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to
Policy Recommendations, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 165, 179-80 (2011), http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/Dia-
mondSaez2011.pdf; Gamage, supra note 228, at 7.
231. See IMF, supra note 230 , at 14; Simkovic, supra note 179, at 2009. But see Fleischer, supra
note 12, at 11.
232. See IMF, supra note 230, at 14; Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA.
TAX REV. 39, 77-79 (1996).
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in addition to labor income. This view is partially based on the growing recog-
nition in recent years that taxing capital income is necessary to improve the
distributional equity of the tax system. 23 3 Capital income is generally distrib-
uted more unequally than labor income, because the wealthy tend to own a
greater percentage of capital than average and low-income taxpayers. 23 4
Based on this reasoning, multiple commentators have concluded that taxing
capital income would improve the progressivity of the tax system. 23 5 Simi-
larly, horizontal equity concerns also support taxing capital income because
income from capital, like income from labor, also increases a taxpayer's abil-
ity to pay and should be taxed comparably. 23 6
In addition, taxing capital income would reduce, rather than increase,
market distortions and improve economic growth. 23 7 Numerous scholars have
persuasively argued that many of the justifications commonly proffered for
the capital gains tax preference are questionable. 23 8 Common rationales in-
clude the argument that the lower tax rate is necessary to (i) increase savings
and encourage risk-taking; (ii) avoid taxing gains attributable to inflation; (iii)
avoid taxing income that has already been taxed as either salary or business
income; and (iv) minimize the lock-in effect 23 9 or the risk that taxpayers will
hold onto assets longer than economically efficient in order to avoid the tax
on disposition. 24 0 These rationales have been criticized on several grounds,
233. See IMF, supra note 230, at 14; Chris Evans & Richard Krever, Taxing Capital Gains: A Com-
parative Analysis and Lessons for New Zealand, 23 N.Z.J. TAx'N L. & POL'Y 486, 490-91 (2017);
Gamage, supra note 228, at 3-4; Gamage, supra note 12, at 401; Kahng, supra note 227, at 609;
Kleinbard, supra note 12, at 645-60.
234. See Evans & Krever, supra note 233, at 491; Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez & Stefanie
Stantcheva, Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities, 6 AM. ECON. J.:
ECON. POL'Y 230, 245-46 (2014).
235. See IMF, supra note 230, at 14; Evans & Krever, supra note 233, at 491; Gamage, supra note
228, at 3-4; Gamage, supra note 12, at 401; Kahng, supra note 227, at 609.
236. See Evans & Krever, supra note 233, at 491.
237. See Gamage, supra note 12, at 424-26.
238. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah & Zelik, supra note 12, at 1-2; Noel B. Cunningham &; Deborah H.
Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains Preference, 48 TAx L. REv. 319, 344-45 (1993); Daniel
Halperin,A Capital Gains Preference is NotEVENa Second-Best Solution, 48 TAX L. REv. 381, 381,
385-91 (1993); Calvin H. Johnson, Taxing the Consumption of Capital Gains, 28 VA. TAX REV. 477,
500 & n.87 (2009); Fleischer, supra note 12, at 10-12, 35-39.
239. Many commentators agree that the lock-in effect is probably the strongest argument for a cap-
ital gains preference. See Fleischer, supra note 12, at 38 (explaining that "[l]ock-in both reduces
revenue and creates an additional efficiency cost because the holders of appreciated assets may not be
the most economically efficient owner of the assets").
240. See Walter J. BlumA Handy Summary ofthe Capital Gains Arguments, 35 TAxES 247, 252-
58 (1957); Orly Mazur, Social Impact Bonds: A Tax-Favored Investment?, 9 COLUM. J. TAX L. 141,
165 (2017); Fleischer, supra note 12, at 35-39.
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including findings that empirical evidence fails to clearly support that a lower
tax rate increases investments and stimulates economic growth and that the
benefits of deferral counteract the taxation of non-economic gains. 24 1 Thus,
continuing to allow capital gains to be taxed at a lower tax rate increases the
risk of capital being misallocated. 24 2
An increasing number of scholars have also found the argument that tax-
ing all capital investment the same as labor income could reduce investments
in capital assets or cause capital flight to be misguided. 24 3 Instead, granting
different tax treatments to different types of income introduces additional eco-
nomic inefficiencies in the market and reduces social welfare. 24 4 This is be-
cause we currently have an oversupply of capital in the United States, which
is likely to further increase as a result of the recent capital incentives imple-
mented by the 2017 Tax Act.245 This surplus of capital depresses the rates of
return on U.S. capital and results in a growing number of unproductive invest-
ments. 24 6 Accordingly, incentives to encourage capital investment are waste-
ful and unnecessary. 24 7 Moreover, subsidizing this tax preference prevents
Congress from using its limited government revenues for other measures that
can more effectively create jobs and more directly stimulate economic
growth. 24 8
Taxing capital income is also necessary because the disparate tax treat-
ment of capital versus labor income encourages tax gaming. 24 9 Specifically,
241. See Blum, supra note 240, at 265; Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 238, at 377-79.
242. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 240, at 265; Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 238, at 343-45;
Halperin, supra note 238, at 385-91; Johnson, supra note 238, at 500-01; Mazur, supra note 240, at
165; Fleischer, supra note 12, at 11.
243. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah & Zelik, supra note 12, at 59; Calvin H. Johnson, Wasting $2.5 Trillion
on No-Growth Capital, 158 TAX NOTES 909 (2018); Kleinbard, supra note 12, at 656-58.
244. See Evans & Krever, supra note 233, at 491; Louis Kaplow, Human Capital Under an Ideal
Income Tax, 80 VA. L. REV. 1477, 1513 (1994); Simkovic, supra note 179, at 1982.
245. See Johnson, supra note 243; Kleinbard, supra note 12, at 656 (noting that "the United States,
along with most other advanced economies, is held back by weakness in demand, not capital supply").
246. See Johnson, supra note 243.
247. See id. at 911. It is also possible that certain tax preferences, such as expensing or accelerated
depreciation, could result in less U.S. investment, rather than more due to behavioral biases of firms.
Lily L. Batchelder, Accounting for Behavioral Considerations in Business Tax Reform: The Case of
Expensing 4 (Jan. 24, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract id=2904885) (observing that "firms would respond less to the positive investment
incentives created by expensing than traditional corporate finance theory suggests" and that expensing
may result in less U.S. investments than otherwise would be the case).
248. See Johnson, supra note 243.
249. See Avi-Yonah & Zelik, supra note 12, at 40-58; Evans & Krever, supra note 233, at 491;
Gamage, supra note 12, at 366, 424-26.
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taxing labor income more heavily than capital income incentivizes high-in-
come taxpayers to mischaracterize labor income as capital income, thereby
significantly minimizing their tax burden. 25 0 This type of tax avoidance fur-
ther undermines the tax system by creating deadweight losses, unnecessary
tax administration costs, and further inequality. 25 1 These issues are exacer-
bated as it continues to become more difficult to distinguish between labor
income and capital income. 25 2
Advances in robotics and other forms of artificial intelligence present an
added impetus for taxing capital. First, as discussed above, the growing use
of automation is transforming the labor market and is likely to result in a de-
crease in labor income for a period of time.25 3 With a declining return to labor,
a tax system that heavily relies on the taxation of labor income will be unsus-
tainable. Taxing capital, a rapidly growing source of production, will help
mitigate the decline in tax revenues. 254
Second, automation is likely to occur regardless of whether or not capital
income is subject to taxation. 255 Market forces already encourage taxpayers
to invest in robotics, artificial intelligence, and other forms of capital. 256 Tax
incentives to purchase capital assets are likely to result in an overinvestment
in automation. 257 They contribute to a misallocation of resources and are
likely to accelerate the shift from the use of labor towards the use of capital,
thereby contributing to further job losses, budget deficits, and economic ine-
quality. 258 Conversely, taxing capital income would better promote economic
growth by minimizing inequality, reducing existing economic distortions
250. See IMF, supra note 230, at 14; Fleischer, supra note 12, at 32; Gamage, supra note 228, at 5;
Kleinbard, supra note 202, at 45-47. Treating different types of capital income differently for tax
purposes also incentivizes taxpayers to classify certain capital investments as tax-favored investments.
See IMF, supra note 230, at 14.
251. See Evans & Krever, supra note 233, at 491; Gamage, supra note 228, at 5, 65-66; Kleinbard,
supra note 12, at 658-59.
252. See Kahng, supra note 227, at 610 (arguing that the tax law subsidizes capital owners' conver-
sion of their workers' labor into intellectual capital, which makes the tax law's distinction between
labor income and capital income no longer meaningful); Fleischer, supra note 12, at 3-6 (observing
that founders' stock, partnership equity, and carried interest earn capital gains essentially allow tax-
payers to convert their labor efforts into capital gains).
253. See supra Sections IIA-B.
254. See Kleinbard, supra note 12, at 593.
255. See Soled & Thomas, supra note 8, at 2-3, 49.
256. See Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 8, at 145-47; Yoram Margalioth, Not a Panacea for
Economic Growth: The Case ofAccelerated Depreciation, 26 VA. TAX REV. 493, 494-95, 499 (2007);
Batchelder, supra note 247, at 10.
257. See Johnson, supra note 243, at 909; supra Section II.C.
258. See Johnson, supra note 243, at 910; supra notes 59, 177, 242 and accompanying text.
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created by the tax system, and providing the government with a larger revenue
base with which to invest in human capital-the "most important capital
stock" of our economy. 259
Third, these automation technologies potentially further minimize the dis-
tinction between capital and labor income, which, combined with the dispar-
ate tax treatment of capital and labor, is likely to present additional tax-gaming
opportunities. 260 Experts predict that jobs in the new technological era are
likely to complement the tasks completed by robots. As the relationship be-
tween capital and labor becomes further interdependent in economic produc-
tion, the government's ability to distinguish between labor and capital income
is likely to become more challenging and arbitrary. 261 This, in turn, increases
taxpayer opportunities to convert labor income into capital income for tax
purposes. 262 With the rise in automation more closely tying together capital
and labor in economic production, it makes even less sense to require the dis-
aggregation of the return for purposes of taxing them at different rates. 263
Finally, automation exacerbates the tax system's effect on economic ine-
quality. The current tax system already benefits capital owners at the expense
of workers by under-taxing capital income. Automation is likely to further
benefit these same capital owners by allowing them to capitalize the profits
generated by the additional productivity that automation brings at the expense
of low- and middle-class workers.264 Thus, the substantial tax preferences
granted to many high-income capital owners further contribute to the distri-
butional effects of automation. Taxing capital income would help minimize
the widening economic gap between capital owners and workers. 26 5
In sum, the rise in automation is one more factor in favor of taxing capital
income and should be taken into account in analyzing changes to the tax sys-
tem. 266 This change would help raise revenue, redistribute wealth to alleviate
259. See Kleinbard, supra note 12, at 656-60; supra Section IV.A.2.
260. See Kahng, supra note 227, at 607-10, 639-46.
261. See Kahng, supra note 227, at 639-46 (arguing that the rise of intellectual capital already cre-
ates this type of interdependent relationship, which makes it difficult to disaggregate economic pro-
duction into labor income and capital income).
262. See Kahng, supra note 227, at 641 (noting a "widespread ability to convert self-supplied labor
into capital gain").
263. See id. at 646.
264. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
265. See PIKETTY, supra note 52, at 373-74 (explaining that "an effective tax rate of 30 percent, if
applied to all forms of capital, can by itself account for a very significant deconcentration of wealth");
Aghion et al., supra note 12, at 2.
266. Many scholars support the introduction of a progressive consumption tax instead of our current
income tax system. See, e.g., Bankman & Weisbach, supra note 228; Zodrow, supra note 228, at 51.
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inequality, and improve economic efficiency. 267 Even though this change
would not address the potential decline in jobs due to automation, it would
minimize the tax law's influence on promoting automation at the expense of
human workers and distorting employers' hiring choices. 268 Thus, this change
would address some of the concerns raised by the robot tax, but without the
robot tax's insurmountable administrative issues and its accompanying at-
tempts to hinder certain technological advancements.
2. Proposals to Tax Capital Income
The above discussion gives rise to the question: how should we tax capital
income? 269 Although an analysis of the numerous ways to implement a capital
tax is outside the scope of this article, this Article argues that, for the reasons
described above, Congress should consider eliminating the distinction be-
tween labor and capital income for tax purposes and curtailing certain tax ex-
penditures that significantly subsidize the creation of capital income. 270 It
However, a consumption tax would not solve many of the concerns raised by the automation revolu-
tion. See James Kwak, Reducing Inequality with a Retrospective Tax on Capital, 25 CORNELL JL. &
PUB. POL'Y 191, 215-16 (2015). For instance, "[d]espite its theoretical advantage in economic effi-
ciency, a consumption tax is not an adequate vehicle to address the problem of growing wealth ine-
quality" because it would not significantly impact the accumulation and transmission of wealth. Id.
267. See FORD, supra note 2, at 277-78; PIKETTY, supra note 52, at 373-74; supra note 242 and
accompanying text.
268. See FORD, supra note 2, at 277-78 (noting that the current labor-focused tax system increases
the cost of human workers relative to automation technology).
269. See supra Section IV.B. 1. For purposes of this article, "capital income" generally refers to
returns on investments, which are often viewed as comprised of "the real risk-free rate of return, the
risk premium, and inframarginal return." See Noel B. Cunningham, The Taxation ofCapital Income
and the Choice ofTax Base, 52 TAX L. REV. 17, 23 (1996). More generally, it includes: (i) the capital
income of individual investors, which comes in the form of interest, dividends, rental income, royal-
ties, and capital gains; (ii) the capital income of firms, which includes most net business income; and
(iii) imputed rental income from owner-occupied housing. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TAXING
CAPITAL INCOME: EFFECTIVE MARGINAL TAX RATES UNDER 2014 LAW AND SELECTED POLICY
OPTIONS 4-6 (2014), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/49817; Kleinbard, supra note 12, at 602.
270. See supra Section IV.B. 1. Other scholars have persuasively argued for the need to abolish the
distinction between labor and capital income in contexts outside of the automation discussion. See,
e.g., Fleischer, supra note 12, at 1-6 (concluding that because capital income is often a disguised form
of labor income by wealthy taxpayers, Congress should tax capital and labor income at a uniform rate
to improve income equality in the United States); Kahng, supra note 227, at 644-48 (arguing for the
elimination of the tax preference for capital gains and dividend income because capital and labor often
work interdependently in creating economic income and should be taxed equally on the return of their
investment); Simkovic, supra note 179, at 1985 (suggesting that harmonizing the different tax rates
imposed on capital and labor may be necessary in order to minimize the tax system's effect on dis-
torting investment decisions and contributing to an underinvestment in education). In addition, recent
scholarship is beginning to recognize that the rise in robotics creates an additional need to abolish tax
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supports taxing all capital more in parity with labor, rather than singling out
robots or certain types of capital for taxation as suggested by the robot tax.27 1
In particular, Congress should eliminate the major tax preferences granted
to capital income. Given the questionable rationales given for the preferential
capital gains tax rate and the reasons above for taxing capital income, Con-
gress should give serious consideration to increasing the low tax rate currently
imposed on capital gains and dividend income so that income produced by
capital is taxed at the same rate as income produced by labor. To accomplish
this change, Congress could simply abolish the distinction between capital
gains and ordinary income and apply a single, progressive tax rate schedule
to all income. 272 "Doing so would reduce inequality at the very top, and it
would cost little in terms of efficiency." 2 73 It would also minimize significant
economic distortions, simplify the tax code, and minimize the tax preference
for robots over human workers. 274 Moreover, this type of change is not un-
precedented. In fact, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 taxed capital gains in parity
with ordinary income, at rates up to 28%.
Congress should also target the tax code provisions that enable taxpayers
to expense or deduct the cost of a capital investment prior to the time that they
are economically used, such as the accelerated depreciation deduction provi-
sion and bonus expensing. 275 This is one of the most significant benefits
preferences related to capital income. See, e.g., Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 8, at 150-51;
Soled & Thomas, supra note 8, at 25-26, 34-39.
271. See supra note 270 and accompanying text. For a discussion and critique of the robot tax, see
supra Part III.
272. See infra notes 273-74 and accompanying text. Other methods also exist for minimizing the
tax preference currently granted to capital gains. For instance, instead of abolishing the capital gains
tax, Congress could raise the tax rate on capital gains so that it is the same as the top rate on ordinary
income, as it did in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and include additional measures to minimize the
lock-in effect, bunching, cherry-picking of losses, and avoidance of unrealized gains. See Avi-Yonah
& Zelik, supra note 12, at 59-60 (suggesting adopting a single tax rate for all income, but including
certain caveats to make up for the fact that we have a realization-based system). Alternatively, Pro-
fessor Kleinbard recommends retaining a dual income tax structure and using a special tax tool to
separate labor and capital income when intermingled. Kleinbard, supra note 12, at 593, 612-21. Ac-
cording to Kleinbard, even though the tax applied to capital gains would be a flat tax, it would be
progressive, because it would be measured and imposed annually. See id. at 666-74.
273. Fleischer, supra note 12, at 42.
274. See Tax Reform and the Tax Treatment of Capital Gains: Joint Hearing Before the H.R.Comm.
on Ways & Means and the S. Fin. Comm., 112th Cong. 36-50 (2012) (statement of Leonard E. Bur-
man, Professor, Syracuse University), https://waysandmeans.house.gov/wp-content/up-
loads/2017/07/20120920FC.pdf.
275. I.R.C. §§ 168, 179, 197 (2018). This approach is comparable to the approach taken by South
Korea with the introduction of its "robot tax." See Hoke, supra note 46, at 15. Instead of taxing
robots, the South Korean legislation reduces the tax deductions available to companies investing in
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afforded to businesses and investors, which has become even more significant
in light of the changes made by the recent Tax Act.276 These provisions enable
a company to deduct the cost of automation technology and other capital in-
vestments prior to the time the asset economically declines in value, whereas
the cost of human labor is only deductible at the time the worker's wages are
paid. 27 7 Although this current tax incentive may increase worker productivity
and potentially also increase wages for workers that remain in the labor force,
this benefit is distortionary and is more likely to be recouped by businesses in
the form of higher profits. 278 In addition, this incentive is both costly and, in
many cases, unnecessary. As Lily Batchelder points out, the behavioral con-
siderations of firms suggest that "economic cost recovery coupled with a
lower statutory rate would induce a larger increase in US investment among
public and very large companies than ... expensing." 279
Certain provisions that enable capital owners to defer or even completely
escape taxation entirely should also be reconsidered. In particular, the reali-
zation principle, which allows capital owners to defer gains until they dispose
of the asset or otherwise engage in another realization event, is one such pro-
vision. 28 0 The realization principle provides capital owners with a substantial
benefit: it enables investors to indefinitely defer taxes on capital gains, thereby
enabling them to considerably reduce their effective tax rates with respect to
that investment, whereas income generated from labor is generally taxed im-
mediately. 28 1 To tax these two streams of income in parity, one option would
be to adopt mark-to-market or an accrual-based tax in place of the realization
requirement. 28 2 Numerous proposals exist for taxing capital on an accrual-
automation technology. See id.
276. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13201, 131 Stat. 2054, 2105-09 (2017)
(codified at I.R.C. § 168(k) (2018)). The 2017 Tax Act temporarily increases the benefits to capital
owners by allowing taxpayers to immediately deduct the entire cost of an asset placed in service after
September 27, 2017, and before January 1, 2023. See id. After the taxable year 2022, the 100%
allowance is phased down by 20% per calendar year. Id. The new Tax Act also expands this bonus
depreciation deduction to include used assets as well as new assets. Id.
277. See Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 8, at 163-65.
278. See Lee Fang, Tax Bill Will Lead to More Automation, Executives Boast to Wall Street Inves-
tors, THE INTERCEPT (Dec. 14, 2017, 10:52 AM), https://theintercept.com/2017/12/14/tax-bill-provi-
sion-will-lead-to-more-automation-executives-boast-to-wall-street-investors/; Nicole Goodkind,
Trump Tax Plan Gives Jobs Away to Robots and Will Increase Unemployment, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 15,
2017, 6:59 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/tax-plan-robots-jobs-senate-republicans-712930.
279. Batchelder, supra note 247, at 35.
280. See I.R.C. § 1001 (2018); supra note 96 (explaining the realization principle).
281. See Avi-Yonah & Zelik, supra note 12, at 13-14 (explaining how the realization principle
encourages deferral, which reduces the effective tax rate); supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
282. Avi-Yonah & Zelik, supra note 12, at 2, 58-60.
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basis instead of on a realization-basis. 28 3 However, many of these methods
are politically unpopular and would potentially involve an additional element
of complexity.28 4 Other methods also exist for eliminating the benefits of the
realization requirement for taxing capital gains that do not involve accrual-
based taxation, such as a retrospective capital tax 285 or adding an interest
charge upon realization. 28 6
In addition to minimizing the benefits that a realization-based tax system
provides to capital owners, Congress should also eliminate the step-up in an
asset's basis that capital owners receive upon the death of the transferor. 28 7
This provision enables capital owners to completely avoid taxation of gains,
which is yet another expensive and unnecessary subsidy for capital owners. 288
In short, the current tax code contains many provisions that allow capital
income to partially or completely escape taxation. However, investing in hu-
man capital and making other targeted government investments that increase
the value of human workers to the economy may be more beneficial to the
economy overall than using limited resources to provide many of these capital
incentives. 28 9 Thus, Congress should reevaluate the continued necessity of
many of these capital tax preferences in an effort to more fully tax capital
income.
C. Additional Policy Options
Despite the foregoing, even if the changes proposed above to reform the
payroll and income tax system are adopted, not all of the problems raised by
the automation revolution are resolved. The proposed tax changes will likely
generate additional tax revenues, minimize economic inequality, and may
283. See id. at 2.
284. See id. at 2-3.
285. See Kwak, supra note 266, at 221 (suggesting that "[s]uch a system assesses tax liabilities only
when an investor receives cash flows from investments, but calculates those liabilities based on the
imputed historical value of those investments").
286. See Avi-Yonah & Zelik, supra note 12, at 3. If the realization principle remains, additional
measures may need to be taken to address the problem of the lock-in effect arising from an increase
in the capital gains tax rate. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah & Zelik, supra note 12, at 59 (recommending taxing
capital gains at the same rate as ordinary income but excluding principal residences from taxation and
not setting the combined tax rate too high); Fleischer, supra note 12, at 42 (suggesting a revision of §
1202 of the tax code to "mitigate the lock-in effect on small business owners").
287. See I.R.C. § 1014 (2018).
288. See Avi-Yonah & Zelik, supra note 12, at 14.
289. See Brian E. Lebowitz, On the Mistaxation ofInvestment in Human Capital, 52 TAX NOTES
825 (1991); Sinkovic, supra note 179, at 1981-85.
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increase the use of human labor; but the changes will not sufficiently counter-
act the predicted disruption of the current workforce, the negative social and
personal welfare implications associated with unemployment, and the grow-
ing inequality gap. Accordingly, tax policy alone cannot solve all of the issues
raised by the robotics revolution. 290 Instead, tax policy needs to be taken into
account together with government regulation and targeted government spend-
ing to better address some of these concerns. 291 Of course, achieving these
types of changes in the current environment also brings up political economy
concerns which would need to be addressed. 292
Existing scholarship sets forth a plethora of proposals for how to address
the issues presented by the current automation revolution. 293 Each of these
proposals will require an additional source of tax revenues to finance, which
further supports reforming our current tax system to tax capital and add addi-
tional sources of tax revenue. 294 Although this Article does not undertake a
full normative analysis of these additional policy proposals, it sets forth some
public policy options for the purpose of illustrating the potential type of gov-
ernment action that is necessary to address these issues and why these options
are preferable to a robot tax.
One common proposal is to increase the government's investment in hu-
man capital. 295 In particular, the government could provide additional funds
290. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 21, at 3-4 (suggesting various nontax strat-
egies to address the automation issue).
291. See id.; Simkovic, supra note 179, at 1981-85. A thorough analysis of these regulatory and
spending changes is beyond the scope of this Article. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra
note 21, at 4 (noting that automation raises several policy questions and that addressing them "will be
a significant policy challenge for the next Administration and its successors").
292. See Fleischer, supra note 12, at 7 n.8 (observing that political institutions are imperfect and
that the "political preferences ofvoters" should be accounted for in the scholarly debate of tax reform).
In particular, as labor's share of income continues to decline, so does its bargaining power. See Yasser
Abdih & Stephan Danninger, What Explains the Decline of the U.S. Labor Share of Income?: An
Analysis of State and Industry Level Data 11, 21 (IMF, Working Paper No. 17/167, 2017),
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2017/07/24/What-Explains-the-Decline-of-the-U-S-
45086; Fleischer, supra note 12, at 6 (observing that income inequality "threatens the democratic po-
litical process"). Thus, to effectively counter inequality and enhance the likelihood that pro-labor
policies are implemented, we would need to strengthen the economic position of labor, through labor
unions or other methods, to give it a political voice. See Abdih & Danninger, supra, at 11, 21. A full
discussion of these political concerns is outside the scope of this Article. See generally id.
293. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 21, at 3-4.
294. See Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 8, at 175; supra Sections IV.A-B.
295. See, e.g., NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 21, at 1-3; IMF, supra note 230, at 21-31;
THE SECOND MACHINE AGE, supra note 1, at 208-12; Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 8, at 161;
Hoke, supra note 46, at 13-14; Soled & Thomas, supra note 8, at 46-49; Calfornia Tax on Robots,
Automation Equals a Tax on Innovation, supra note 13 1; Cousins, supra note 127; De Chant, supra
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to improve the quality, effectiveness, and access to education and worker re-
training systems. 296 This change may come in the form of direct government
spending, such as increasing federally funded education grant programs, re-
ducing interest rates on student loans, and increasing loan limits on federal
student loans. 297 Alternatively, the investment can be made through increased
tax expenditures related to labor, such as training and hiring incentives for
employers and more expansive tuition credits and deductions. 298
Although unlikely to prevent a labor market disruption, this policy change
is critical to increasing the likelihood that the labor force is able to acquire the
skills necessary to complement automation's role in the economy. 299 As noted
in a report prepared by the Executive Office of the President, "While relative
wages depend on the demand for different levels of skill, which is partially a
function of technology, wages also depend on the supply of labor at various
skill levels, which is influenced by the distribution of educational opportunity
and attainment."3 0 0
As in past periods of technological advancement, investing in human cap-
ital can help mitigate (but not prevent) the effects of technological unemploy-
ment resulting from the increased use of robotics and other artificial intelli-
gence-and it can do so without impeding innovation.3 0 1 Moreover,
increasing tax expenditures related to labor could help equalize the treatment
of capital and labor income far better than a robot tax with its penalizing effect
on innovation.3 0 2 It may also help reduce income inequality by potentially
note 67.
296. See NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 21, at 2, 26; THE SECOND MACHINE AGE, supra
note 1, at 208-12; Gary E. Marchant, Yvonne A. Stevens & James M. Hennessy, Technology, Unem-
ployment & Policy Options: Navigating the Transition to a Better World, J. EVOLUTION & TECH., Feb.
2014, at 26, 30.
297. See Simkovic, supra note 179, at 2031-32.
298. See id. at 2031.
299. See NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 21, at 2; THE SECOND MACHINE AGE, supra
note 1, at 208-12; Hoke, supra note 46, at 13-14.
300. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 21, at 23 (noting that "[r]elative wages also de-
pend on collective bargaining, minimum wage laws, and other institutions and policies that affect wage
setting" (footnote omitted)).
301. See De Chant, supra note 67 (quoting professor David Autor that "U.S. economic preeminence
in [the] 20th century had a lot to do with ours being the most skilled and flexible workforce in the
world" (alteration in original)). But see Perry & Kupper, supra note 58 (expressing skepticism at the
ability of improved education and training to adequately solve workforce disruptions caused by this
new wave of automation).
302. See Soled & Thomas, supra note 8, at 40-42; Chris Arnold, Tax Bill Favors Adding Robots
Over Workers, Critics Say, NPR (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/12/08/5691183 10/tax-bill-
favors-adding-robots-over-workers-critics-say; Kovacev, supra note 126.
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increasing wages of both skilled and unskilled workers, thereby "em-
power[ing] workers to ensure broadly shared growth" created by technology
advances.30 3 In short, by seeking to fill existing and new jobs, rather than
prolonging the inefficient use of human labor in unnecessary tasks, this direct
spending of resources is superior to using a robot tax to address the harmful
effects of automation and is a positive complement to the tax policy changes
suggested above.
Similarly, another human capital investment that is worth considering is
an investment in the development of technology that matches displaced work-
ers to vacant and newly created jobs.30 4 This type of investment can also help
minimize the negative effects of a labor market disruption by maximizing em-
ployment in existing jobs.3 0 5 However, this proposal assumes that jobs will
exist for which humans can train and be matched. In the event that full auto-
mation were to occur in the future, it would be an inadequate solution. Nev-
ertheless, these policy options are useful short-term and medium-term tools
for preparing workers for the new labor market and mitigating the impact of
technological unemployment.3 0 6
Other proposals focus on the need to strengthen social benefit systems,
which are necessary components of a public policy that seeks to effectively
prepare for growing technological change and minimize its negative impact
on displaced workers.3 0 7 One government policy idea increasingly suggested
worldwide in response to these automation concerns is an old idea: that of
universal basic income.3 0 8 Universal basic income refers to the idea that all
303. ExEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 21, at 30-37; see NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL,
supra note 21, at 1-2; IMF, supra note 230, at 1, 21-22; THE SECOND MACHINE AGE, supra note 1,
at 208-12 (suggesting that if the supply of unskilled labor decreases, then wages may increase).
304. See THE SECOND MACHINE AGE, supra note 1, at 217-18; David Nordfors, How to Disrupt
Unemployment, HUFFINGTON POST (July 25, 2014, 1:49 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-
nordfors/how-innovation-can-disrup-unemployment b 5616562.html; Vivek Wadhwa, We Need a
New Version of Capitalism for the Jobless Future, WASH. POST (July 20, 2015), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2015/07/20/we-need-a-new-version-of-capitalism-for-the-job-
less-future/. This investment can provide funding to support either a public or private creation of such
a database. THE SECOND MACHINE AGE, supra note 1, at 217-18.
305. See THE SECOND MACHINE AGE, supra note 1, at 217-18; Nordfors, supra note 304.
306. See THE SECOND MACHINE AGE, supra note 1, at 217; Marchant, Stevens & Hennessy, supra
note 296, at 36.
307. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 21, at 3; NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL,
supra note 21, at 2; Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 8, at 162; Cousins, supra note 127.
308. See, e.g., IMF, supra note 230, at 1-2; FORD, supra note 2, at 249-80; Abbott & Bogenschnei-
der, supra note 8, at 162; Solomon, supra note 31, at 89; Guerreiro et al., supra note 53, at 22; Scott
Santens, What ifYou Got $1,000 a Month, Just for Being Alive? IDecided to Find Out, CNBC (Nov.
15, 2016, 1:39 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/15/what-if-you-got-1000-a-month-just-for-
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citizens-regardless of their employment, wealth, or status-would receive a
fixed, periodic sum of money from the government in order to cover basic
living expenses.3 0 9 Proponents argue that universal basic income would ad-
dress the wage decreases and job insecurity created by automation and would
enable individuals to pursue social development and more creative, innovative
pursuits. 1 0 This system has its benefits, but it is also extremely costly, risks
using funds that could otherwise be deployed to create more inclusive growth,
may dis-incentivize the desire to work, increases benefits for wealthy individ-
uals at the expense of lower-income households, does not replace the physical
and emotional benefits that working provides to individuals, and is not cur-
rently a politically viable solution in the United States.3 1 1 For these reasons,
universal basic income should not be considered as a policy tool at this time.
Given that we do not yet have full automation of the job market and it is un-
certain whether future advances in technology will create full automation, in-
vesting in other social benefit programs to strengthen the social safety net for
workers impacted by automation is preferable.
For instance, better options to strengthen social benefits and redistribute
wealth include increasing spending on unemployment benefits for workers
that have been laid off; providing wage subsidies to help improve wages or
being-alive-i-decided-to-find-out.html. Universal basic income is commonly also referred to as basic
minimum income, guaranteed minimum income, basic income guarantee, and other similar variations.
See generally Kate McFarland, Basic Income 's Terminological Quagmire, BASICINCOME.ORG (Mar.
20, 2017), https://basicincome.org/news/2017/03/opinion-basic-incomes-terminological-quagmire/.
309. See IMF, supra note 230, at 15-17; Rich Haridy, Robot Taxes and Universal Basic Income:
How Do We Manage Our Automated Future?, NEW ATLAS (Feb. 20, 2017), https://newatlas.com/ro-
bot-tax-universal-basic-income-future-work/48014/. Proponents differ on their view as to whether
basic universal income would replace or supplement existing social benefit payments. See Solomon,
supra note 31, at 89-90; Clifford, supra note 64; Haridy, supra. Although various governments have
experimented with small-scale universal basic income or components of this type of social benefit
payment, no country has yet adopted universal basic income that covers its entire population. See
IMF, supra note 230, at 15-17, 29; Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 8, at 162 (noting that Finland
has initiated a pilot program that provides basic income to a small subset of the population and a
Silicon Valley startup incubator plans to launch a private program that provides basic income to some
residents); Haridy, supra (citing to other pilot studies that implement some form of universal basic
income). Most recently, Swiss voters rejected a proposal to introduce universal basic income to all
Swiss residents. Silke Koltrowitz & Marina Depetris, Swiss Reject Free Income Plan After Worker
Vs. Robot Debate, REUTERS (June 5, 2016, 3:37 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-swiss-
vote/swiss-rej ect-free-income-plan-after-worker-vs-robot-debate-idUSKCN0YROCW.
310. See FORD, supra note 2, at 257-64; Clifford, supra note 64.
311. See IMF, supra note 230, at 1-2, 15-18; THE SECOND MACHINE AGE, supra note 1, at 234-
37; Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 8, at 162; Solomon, supra note 31, at 89-90; Philip Aldrick,
Robots May Be Taking Our Jobs, But That Is No Reason to Tax Them, TiMES (Feb. 21, 2017, 12:01
AM), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/robots-may-be-taking-our-jobs-but-that-is-no-reason-to-
tax-them-lf9bfhhxo; Clifford, supra note 64; Haridy, supra note 309.
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subsidize reductions in working hours; implementing wage insurance to en-
courage employment and on-the-job training in new fields;3 12 enhancing the
availability of Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid benefits; and increas-
ing spending on infrastructure and other public investment projects.3 13 These
changes can help provide relief to individuals negatively affected by the au-
tomation of their jobs and also improve the value of the labor force without
introducing as many inefficiencies into the market as a robot tax.314 Tax pol-
icy can also help in this regard through mechanisms such as enhancing the
amount of and access to the earned income tax credit3 15-which provides sup-
port to low-income workers and is essentially a subsidy on labor-or, alterna-
tively, enacting a universal refundable wage tax credit on a capped amount of
every worker's earnings.3 16
Finally, public policy should also include measures that promote innova-
tion.3 17 Past experience has proven that innovation and technological progress
are essential for economic growth and the advancement of society.318 The
312. See ROBERT LITAN, BROOKINGS INST., WAGE INSURANCE: A POTENTIALLY BIPARTISAN WAY
To HELP THE MIDDLE CLASS (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/24_
wageinsurancelitan.pdf. The goal of wage insurance is to help with a skills mismatch in the labor
market by incentivizing unemployed workers to accept a lower-paying job where they may learn new
skills by providing these workers with a portion of their lost wages for a period of time once they find
a new job. Id. at 2. Thus, it helps fund on-the-job training, which may be especially beneficial in
periods were technological change eliminates or creates new jobs. See id. at 1-3.
313. See IMF, supra note 230, at x; Abbott & Bogenschneider, supra note 8, at 160-61; Marchant,
Stevens & Hennessy, supra note 296, at 34-35; Summers, supra note 126.
314. See RACE AGAINST THE MACHINE, supra note 1, at 64, 67; Stevens, supra note 21, at 371-72.
315. See I.R.C. § 32(2018). Some commentators have also proposed converting the earned income
tax credit into a negative income tax by making it larger and universal. See THE SECOND MACHINE
AGE, supra note 1, at 238. A negative income tax essentially provides basic income through the tax
system. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 191-92 (1962).
316. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1001, 123 Stat.
115, 309-12 (codified as amended at I.R.C. 36A (2018)) (repealed 2014); Burman, supra note 192.
317. See generally PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, GOVERNMENT'S MANY ROLES IN FOSTERING
INNOVATION (2010), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/technology/pdf/how-govemments-foster-innova-
tion-2010.pdf (discussing how govermments implement policies encouraging innovation). Other pol-
icy options, in addition to those set forth above, have also been proposed by commentators. For in-
stance, there have been proposals that seek to improve the distribution of benefits by creating a
sovereign wealth fund that pays out any returns as dividends to its citizens. Smith, supra note 151;
Varoufakis, supra note 145. Other proposals have focused on changing the existing social model,
which focuses on employment by decoupling healthcare insurance from employment and creating an
alternative valuation system that does not rely on income from employment. Marchant, Stevens &
Hennessy, supra note 296, at 39-40; see FORD, supra note 2, at 268-69. Proposals have also focused
on additional methods to improve employment by sharing work or imposing special government reg-
ulations, among other measures. See Marchant, Stevens & Hennessy, supra note 296, at 33-36.
318. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 21, at 6-7; MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 31,
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development of artificial intelligence, robotics, and other technology is no ex-
ception.3 19 These technologies have already had positive, transformative im-
pacts in many fields, such as health care, criminal justice, and transportation,
and have the potential to improve workplace conditions and enhance the qual-
ity of our lives. 3 20 Thus, proposals that promote technological progress and
entrepreneurship are beneficial provided that they are designed and imple-
mented in a manner that considers any adverse employment effects and other
implications.3 2 1 For instance, noteworthy, non-tax policy options include in-
creasing government funding for basic research, granting prizes to support
specific innovations, reducing ineffective regulatory burdens,3 22 and creating
direct financial incentives for small business entrepreneurs and other job-cre-
ating businesses and activities. 3 23 Unlike a robot tax, these policy options pro-
mote, rather than curtail, technological progress and can be evaluated and
modified as necessary to improve their effectiveness.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, there is no easy answer to the difficult questions of how to
minimize unemployment, improve economic equality, and raise a sufficient
amount of government tax revenues in an equitable and effective manner-
especially in this new automation era. Although it is clear that a robot tax is
not the answer, the optimal mixture of tax and public policy options is impos-
sible to predict. Nevertheless, it is critical to take action now to search for
solutions that minimize automation's inevitable disruption while maximizing
its benefits. Thus, this Article argues that policymakers should modify the
payroll tax system, introduce a less labor-focused tax system to fund social
insurance programs, tax capital income, and implement a variety of additional
tax and non-tax policy proposals. These policy options provide short- and
medium-term tools that can potentially mitigate the risks of automation as we
at 4; Stevens, supra note 21, at 368.
319. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 21, at 6-7.
320. See THE SECOND MACHINE AGE, supra note 1, at 14-37; NAT'L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra
note 21, at 7-11, 13-14; Marchant, Stevens & Hennessy, supra note 296, at 27.
321. See Stevens, supra note 21, at 369.
322. However, some regulation is necessary and may even encourage innovation. See Michael
Simkovic, Limited Liability and the Known Unknown, 68 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript
1) (available at https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3 121519) (arguing that a limited
liability tax can help improve regulatory responses by revealing valuable information to policymak-
ers).
323. See THE SECOND MACHINE AGE, supra note 1, at 215-20; Marchant, Stevens & Hennessy,
supra note 296, at 31, 34; Stevens, supra note 21, at 369, 381.
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transition into this new era. However, as advances in technology and auto-
mation continue to evolve in unpredictable ways, the effectiveness of these
responses will need to be periodically reevaluated. Ultimately, more radical
solutions may be necessary if the pessimists are correct and these technologi-
cal advances result in a fully automated economy.
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